Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2018 29 inteLLiGenCe AnALysis "Forty years of experience have taught me that failing to identify a specific audi- ence and an intelligence question up front is often at the root of the weakest analytic efforts. In the Art of Review Seminar we talk about 'The Road to Ruin,' the first step on which is not clearly defining the issue to be addressed." - Martin Peterson, CIA AI research and development has en- tered a contemporary stage, where the definition of a problem spurs the work of researchers and engineers to apply the op- timum solutions that they can build. Many of the emerging techniques, algorithms, and analytical capabilities are well suited to solving intelligence problems. An Intelli- gence Problem should be framed in a way that it can be answered specifically. For ex- ample: What set of conditions will cause the adversary to initiate offensive cyber operations, rather than, does the adversary intend to use offensive cyber capabilities. This would be a first principle framing question that would, today, start the IPOE process. Hand in glove with this approach is using the military estimate from the point of view of the adversary: if you were the adversary what would be your Aim, Factors, Course Open and Plan? Engag- ing in the pre-IPB practice of framing the intelligence problem from first principles would assist in determining the types of techniques and tools required to solve it. The ability to access data at the source by generalists has fed the desire to pro- duce intelligence from direct source feeds, rather than from single source analysed reporting. This approach requires teams of specialists working collaboratively in a shared production space. The initial constraint to this approach was compart- mentalization of information as discussed above. The workaround was to provide the single source specialists on these teams with access to their specialist, single source networks. The machines could not share data, but the analysts could. These teams were initially ad-hoc, and their existence was often reliant on the views of senior intelligence personnel in their organiza- tions. Canada was seen as a leader, by her allies, in developing best practices during the Afghanistan conflict. The Canadian All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) was, in effect, a multi-source production cen- tre that conducted collaborative analysis across the intelligence domains. It collect- ed tactically, collaborated with coalition partners, and reached backed to national sources and agencies to deliver informa- tion to its teams of analysts. In 2011, DRDC published a compendi- um of documents known as the Future In- telligence Analysis Capability (FIAC) that captured the advances on the ground and projected the emerging technologies that would affect intelligence production for the next two decades. This initiative was to serve both the need to focus research and development and to provide a roadmap for capability development within the in- telligence community. It has spawned the Joint Intelligence Collection and Analysis Capability (JICAC) research project; and has informed capital initiatives such as the Army Intelligence Strategy, the Joint Intelligence Modernization Project, and Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Recon- naissance (JISR) developments. The Five Eyes partnership has launched a number of initiatives, including Activ- ity Based Intelligence (ABI) and Object Based Processing (OBP) to address the technical issues associated with the shift to multi-INT processing. These two approaches: Framing the in- telligence problem at all levels and adopt- ing a multi-INT production methodol- ogy will prepare the ground for today's emerging technologies, just as adoption of All Source collection and analysis and the IPB process prepared us for GIS and digital manipulation techniques. There is no "end-state" in decision support technologies. An open and evolutionary mindset is required to exploit early and optimally. Conclusion In order to prepare the Intelligence force to be savvy adopters of useful solutions, there are a few steps that can be taken re- gardless of the technology to be used in the future. They include: • Investment in people will always pay big dividends, and in this climate that means focusing on recruiting for the aptitudes and potential to operate in a highly adap- tive and progressive work environment. It also requires a continual assessment of education, training, and retention mod- els to ensure relevance. • An organization and structure that al- lows for scientists, engineers, and intel- ligence specialists to work side by side on intelligence problems. • Physical and cyber infrastructure that is adaptive and scalable in its basic design and allows for the stand-up and dissolu- tion of teams formed for specific situa- tions and projects. • Look at Intelligence processes from first principles and adopt practices that allow for exploitation of new ideas and tech- nologies. • Adopt a cycle of innovation that can take advantage of operational and technical advances to solve problems that are bar- riers to success. Rather than having technology force change, be prepared for the inevitable changes that successful exploitation of technology will bring. Ronald Roach, LCol (retired) CD graduat- ed from The Royal Military College of Cana- da in 1980 with a Bachelor of Arts and was commissioned as an Armour Officer in Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians). His military career spanned a variety of posts and duties, culminating as a Deputy Direc- tor Intelligence at Canadian Army Head- quarters. He is co-owner of Knowledge Bridge Inc. since 2008. Consulting projects over the past few years have included: Spe- cial Advisor and project and training sup- port to CJOC, CFINTCOM, CFD, DRDC, and the African Union's Peace Support Opera- tions Directorate.

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