Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2018 21 aspects, which in the case of most engage- ments either fighter will face, is the most important. The general philosophy with both fighter aircraft is: if you have to get in close and maneuver, you failed. The next measure, which was also a staple of the F-117 program, is the Ra- dar Absorbent Material (RAM) coating. This is a coating applied to the airframe of a stealth aircraft that absorbs as much of the radiation from incoming radar sig- nals as possible. When used in conjunc- tion with an angular design, it proves quite effective. The combined deflection and absorption of radar signals means even less information is returned to the receiver. To simplify how this works, the aircraft's special paint contains absorbent particles, which soak up the incoming ra- diation from the radar signal. There are a few different variations of this technol- ogy and in the case of the F-35, the RAM coating is actually cured into the airframe. The F-22 made use of a coating that was applied, but cold weather and desert cli- mate proved to be detrimental to it and led to increased maintenance costs due to the need for re-application. Now, radar is a powerful tool but, once again, it is not quite as effective as many are led to believe. At least not when it comes to stealth aircraft – especially with the advancements that the F-22 and in- particular, the F-35, have made. Combat radar, like standard radar, relies on transmissions that reflect off surfaces, the return signals of which provide the re- ceiver with information such as heading, speed, etc. of the target. The problem that plagued radars for a long time and still plagues some is background noise. You can crank up the gain on the radar, but at very high levels it will become distort- ed due to atmospheric and background clutter it picks up. Combat radars tend to use the C, X, Ku and S-bands. Low- frequency radars in the L-band and other low frequency wavelengths like Russia's "Sunflower" aren't generally affected by traditional stealth treatments like RAM coatings and deflection angles; however, the accuracy of these systems is poor and they really only serve as an early warning system to alert patrolling aircraft or re- sponse aircraft to the possible presence of Low Observability (LO) threat aircraft. Modern systems, coupled with better algorithms, are enabling radars to put out much more energy while reducing background noise. This mainly applies to ground-based radars, however, to get signals powerful enough to track aircraft at longer ranges with improved accuracy, there needs to be a much stronger signal, and to achieve this, the system must be rather large. This also creates issues with mobility. The Sunflower or Podsolnukh system is massive. Yet that will begin to shift as well, thanks largely to newer semi- conductors made from materials like gal- lium nitride (GaN), which enable higher output at smaller sizes with less compo- nents, though this will likely not be a real factor until the 2035 window and beyond. Knowing all of that, when you look at the vastly smaller size of the AESA radars and other arrays in combat aircraft you should be able to see where this is going. If a massive system with many times the power at its disposal has trouble track- ing and even detecting an aircraft like the F-35, how exactly is an aircraft with a radar that is inferior in almost every way supposed to track it? Now we begin to understand the importance of stealth and why it isn't as "overrated" as many would have us believe. Even if an L-band radar or over the horizon (OTH) system can give an aircraft a rough idea that some- things out there, it's still up to the aircraft with the weaker radar to find it. The Irbis- E X-band radar in the SU-35 is powerful, but if Israel has been operating F-35's in the presence of S-300's in Syria without detection, I highly doubt the Irbis-E is AerosPACe HaveBlue USAF Russia's S-300 surface-to-air missile system.

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