Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2018 31 submarines for the media. Submarine operations, be- cause of their inherent secrecy, are seen as mysterious and often attract dispropor- tionate speculation. These misconceptions are often exacer- bated by attempts to simplify submarine availability statistics, usually to legitimately question their return on investment. Thus, submarines are often (unfairly) likened to domestic vehicles which then spawns the obvious question: why can we not have submarine availability similar to that of the family car? The fact is that submarines are much more akin to aircraft than surface ships (in that they work in three dimen- sions) and when operating they are contin- ually exposed to corrosive salt water, often at extremely high pressure – not something the family car often sees. The truth is almost all navies in the world work on a long proven statistical availabil- ity figure for fleet units, 3 where to have one unit out all the time you need more than three units. One only has to look at the U.K. or France and ask why they operate four ballistic missile submarines to main- tain a continuous at sea nuclear-deterrent of only one submarine? Moreover, the recent inability of the Germany Navy to have any of their six submarines available for operations reflects the complex nature of submarine availability, be it materiel or personnel related. 4 It is worthy to note that all these submarines are supported by a long-standing submarine infrastructure and operated from one geographic area. So how do submarines in Canada com- pared to those of our Allies? Other than during (and a brief period after) the First World War, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) did not operate submarines until the early 1960s and then it was primar- ily from Halifax, N.S. (with a short pe- riod in the 1960s/70s from Esquimalt, B.C.). 5 However, at the time of the ac- quisition of the Victoria-class submarines, Canada's submarine support infrastruc- ture was entirely on the East Coast and inexperienced in the requirements of the new, more automated Victoria-class sub- marine. Additionally, a modern materiel safety management regime was instituted, again similar to that applied by the avia- tion sector. These realities were further complicated by the decision to operate this unique class of four submarines from two diverse geographic areas (separated by 5,000 kilometres). Finally, the tragic fire in HMCS Chicoutimi in 2004 caused a major disruption in the submarine op- erating schedule, when the Canadian submarine support activities were at maxi- mum capacity, causing many to opine that this submarine would never sail again. To be sure, the times were not optimal for submarines in Canada. Notwithstanding, the Victoria-class sub- marines have persevered, often under an intensely negative media spotlight, where the naysayers were quick to point out the number of submarines in routine main- tenance or long refit, but often failed to mention the one submarine that was fre- quently out quietly conducting operations. So, if most navies that enjoy a long history of operating submarines can, at best, get one third of their fleet at sea, what hap- pened to allow Canada to forward deploy SUBMARINES Story

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