Vanguard Magazine

46 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2018 www.vanguardcanada.com the lASt WORD Trust, Presumed Secure and Other Dan- gers of Supply Chain). Espionage allows adversaries to gar- ner military advantage at the design level where important warfare data can provide a direct benefit to their defence industry by copying and improving design or de- veloping operational gain through intelli- gence to be exploited in future conflict. To understand the importance of countering espionage and surveillance related to intel- ligence and operational capabilities, we can pull a few pages from the Second World War and Cold War, where spy tradecraft was professionalized. old school tradecra As early as the Second World War, the tra- decraft included various types of infiltra- tion to enable espionage and intelligence gathering, as well as the sabotage or dis- ruption of missions, keeping ahead of enemy tactics and monitoring sedition or treasonous activities. The real-life vectors of infiltration were more obvious than they are in our current technology-bound world. Today, mali- cious actors use various domains to target assets with technology, adding layers of complexity to obfuscate state actors from non-state disrupters. But the new tra- decraft is only new in its techniques and delivery, whereby the high-level targets and assets are the same and, to some ex- tent, so are the strategies. During the Second World War and Cold War the United States, Canada and former Soviet Union invested heavily in training, espionage and research into new weap- ons and techniques to respond and block known or targeted enemies. The Gouzen- ko affair added fuel to the fire and the money followed (after the Second World War, Gouzenko defected to Canada and later unearthed a USSR espionage net- work in Canada that was spying on former wartime allies 3 ). A little history on U.S. intelligence agen- cies and where the money went: In 1908, the U.S. had formed the Federal Bureau of Investigations, responsible for investi- gating domestic criminal activities and es- pionage. Later, during the Second World War, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created. Evolving into the CIA, the Cold War cemented its structure, missions, meth- ods and directives – to fight "against hostile foreign states or groups or in sup- port of friendly foreign states or groups." Then, in 1952, the National Security Agency (NSA) was developed to focus on information gathering by monitoring, in- tercepting and decoding signals and radio traffic. It was during those periods that the criticality of intelligence agencies to gov- ernment and military protection of na- tional security became heavily manifested in offensive and defensive tactics under the cloak of espionage activities. The resurgence of espionage With government and military striving to reduce costs and increase efficiencies, in- novation and optimization may spearhead a massive defense, security and warfare re- structuring. In fact, I believe we are on the cusp of a major refocus on the threat of infiltration and compromise of mission integrity by espionage activities, where simulation will play a key role in testing defensive and offensive countermeasures. While a little early to guess at what this would look like or who would retain ownership, it would make sense as a hori- zontal entity central to design and testing standards, programmatic responses, train- ing and information, intelligence, and at- tribution for domestic and international threats. I know what you are thinking: we have that. Not quite. This would be operation- ally mandatory with strict impositions and sanctions that would span multiple government departments and private en- tities that provide or manage national as- sets. Further, it would be independent, overarching and highly coordinated, re- sponsive and agile to the changing threat landscape. Simulation would be the cor- nerstone of developing defensive and offensive countermeasures that prevent infiltration and compromise, preventing espionage specifically. With simulation, looking beyond mis- sion accuracy, integrity and increased safety for resources and non-combatants, keeping secrets a secret is essential to both defence capabilities and security posture. Cyber security frameworks that prevent espionage will refine as the prevalence and incidence of espionage increases, playing a dual role as a tactic and a threat. References 1. Defence Science Board, DOD, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, Jan 2013; http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a569975. pdf 2. The Washington Post, May 2013; https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/ confidential-report-lists-us-weapons- system-designs-compromised-by- chinese-cyberspies/2013/05/27/ a42c3e1c-c2dd-11e2-8c3b- 0b5e9247e8ca_story.html?utm_ term=.c1987e1af897 3. Library and Archives Canada; http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/ obj/008001/f2/cold-e.pdf Valarie Findlay is an American Society for Evidenced-Based Policing member and a research fellow for the Police Foundation (USA) with two decades of senior-level ex- pertise in cybersecurity and policing initia- tives. She has worked extensively on fed- eral cyber initiatives and is a member of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police eCrimes Cyber Council and AFCEA DC. She has a Masters in Sociology and a Masters in Terrorism Studies with her dissertation addressing the impacts of terrorism on law enforcement in Western Nations. Simulation would be the cornerstone of developing defensive and offensive countermeasures that prevent infiltration and compromise, preventing espionage specifically.

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