Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com FEBRUARY/MARCH 2019 31 2018 the first of the $3.5 billion Harry DeWolf-class AOPS was launched. Seaspan's non-combat package includes the restarted JSS project (now reduced to two ships), the Polar Icebreaker and a se- ries of CCG scientific, survey and patrol ships. The $3.4 billion JSS, renamed as the Protecteur class, finally began construction in June 2018 with deliveries expected be- tween 2022 and 2024. Work has already begun on the $687 million Offshore Fish- eries Science Vessels with the three ships ex- pected to be delivered by the end of 2019. Seaspan will also build the estimated $1.3 billion Polar Icebreaker and a single $331 million Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel to be completed in 2021-2022. The Challenges Canada's NSS has encountered many chal- lenges, the most significant of which are project cost estimations, shipyard produc- tion gaps, intellectual property negotia- tions, bid protests and communications. On cost estimates, most project budgets were set before the NSS was launched in 2010. The CSC was originally billed for $26 billion but is now recognized as likely costing around $60 billion. Other proj- ects have seen their budgets marked for revision (e.g., the Po- lar Icebreaker) as suc- ceeding delays subject budgets to inflationary pressures. It is true that the "uncertain, ambiguous interconnected global marketplace" can partly account for some of these escalating cost estimates but so can the lack of experienced naval procurement staff within government and industry, lost to cuts and yard layoffs in the 1990s, and, separately, shipyard start-up costs. In Seaspan's case, the yard took two years from 2012 to 2014 to generate ad- ditional sums needed for its upgrades and, separately, hire the necessary management and engineering expertise. A separate issue was modifying the German Berlin design selected for JSS to meet the smaller con- fines of the Vancouver yard. For Irving, recent progress on the AOPS in conjunction with delays on the CSC have seen an 18-month production gap emerge between the two projects. The Halifax yard claimed it needed orders for two more AOPS and maintenance con- tracts for the seven East Coast-based Hali- fax-class frigates or it would have to lay off its workforce. Regionalism and shipbuilding are not new in Canada but have returned to the surface over the last three years following Federal Fleet Services' securing of a nearly $700 million contract for an interim AOR ship. The contract has been the source of industrial squabbling, allegations of confi- dential leaks, and the role of federal parti- san political calculations in both Quebec and Nova Scotia. There is also the question of poor com- munications concerning the NSS's overall performance. Despite recognizing in its 2016 annual report on the NSS that there existed "insufficient communications with Canadians on the cost, timelines and prog- ress of various builds", the promise of reg- ular reporting and updates has not been acted on. Australia's Naval Shipbuilding Plan Historical Context Australia's Naval Shipbuilding Plan is large- ly the outcome of a 2015 RAND Corpo- ration study born out of the experiences of acquiring the Collins-class submarines and the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers (AWD). Arguably, the more influential of the two projects, six Collins class were built in Australia and entered service between 1996 and 2003. The Collins class build did not go smoothly though. The project ran into delays and cost overruns. A lack of sub- marine building knowhow led to unrealistic specifications, costing and scheduling. The absence of early-stage industry engagement made this situation even worse. The second project, the AWDs, began construction in 2012. Based on the Spanish F-100 design, two of the three ships have entered service, with the third expected in late 2019. Assembled in South Australia, the AWDs are A$1.2 billion over budget

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