Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2019 15 interview Q You have been with the NSS since the government's announcement of the program and the subsequent selection of the two shipyards. We understand that you initially had responsibility for both shipyards as well, so one might say you have seen it all over the past nine years. What things would you say were the hap- piest surprises? I became director general of the newly cre- ated Marine Sector in December 2010, about six months after the National Ship- building Strategy (NSS) was announced, so some really solid foundational work had already been done by the time I arrived. It's unbelievable how quickly the time has passed. For the first few years, before the shipbuilding projects really got going, I was responsible for all the marine procure- ment files, including both NSS packages of work. In 2016, we reorganized, and I became director general of the Large Com- bat Ship Construction Sector, so my focus became Irving Shipbuilding and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and Ca- nadian Surface Combatant (CSC) projects. I'm not sure that it was a particular sur- prise, because honestly, I really didn't know what to expect, but I have to say that the modernization of the Irving Shipbuilding Inc. (ISI) Halifax Shipyard and Seaspan's Vancouver Shipyard have just been incred- ible transformations. I was there when the Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels were being built at ISI's old yard. I saw the shipyard being torn down as the last ship went through and then saw the new yard being built. I've been to that yard now more times than I could count, but I'm impressed with what they've done every time I walk through it. Similarly, I used to visit the Vancouver Shipyard when everything was quiet, with no significant work being done and, just recently, I vis- ited the yard for the first time in years and it's impressive to see too. Moreover, all this modernization is a testament to the power of competition, because over $500 million in modernization has been done at no cost to the federal government. That means a lot to a procurement guy like me. Q What would you have done differ- ently, knowing what you do now? There are certainly a lot of little things I would have done differently, but one of the most important is that I think we could have done a much better job of expectation management. Particularly following the shipyard selection, in order to establish re- alistic expectations regarding how long the shipyard modernization would take, and therefore when ship construction would start, and how challenging and complex this all is. I'm afraid people got the impres- sion that the yards would start building ships immediately after the announcement and would hit the ground running like they had been building large ships for decades. We have learned a lot since then regarding how really difficult all of this is. Q It has been suggested that pursuing something as challenging as continu- ous shipbuilding with essentially three autonomous departments involved in every major contracting decision merely exacerbates the customer's ability to deliver cogent and timely decisions. Our Allies tend to have clearer accountability within government. Might you be able to provide some examples of where Canada's approach has provided benefits to NSS? There is no question that Canada's shared accountability model for defence procure- ment brings with it some significant chal- lenges. However, it also ensures that all of the various – sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, but always numerous – interests and objectives of the government (including satisfaction of op- erational requirements, ensuring that ben- efits flow to Canadian industry, fair open and transparent processes and, of course, value for money) are all brought forward and given due consideration together. Things get delayed when decisions are de- ferred or made in isolation, and therefore often need to be revisited. To ensure that the joined-up decision- making process proceeds in a timely and effective manner, the NSS instituted an in- terdepartmental governance structure, so all the involved departments were sitting around the same table at the same time. My department, Public Services and Procure- ment Canada (PSPC), chairs those meet- ings. While we may not be accountable for a particular decision (for example, if it's a requirements decision, then National De- fence or the Canadian Coast Guard would be accountable), we are accountable to en- sure than a decision is made. This governance structure proved its worth and has since been expanded to encompass the overarching Defence Pro- curement Strategy. A good example where this joined-up decision making worked well was the decision regarding actions to address the potential production gap at ISI. Over about the past year, decisions were made to not only extend the AOPS production line for a sixth ship for the Royal Canadian Navy, but to also procure a seventh and eighth ship for the Coast Guard. This was a decision that required all the departments to come together and agree on a common strategy that ad- dressed everyone's interests in a relatively short timeframe. Q NSS introduced two continuous programs of work, one for each ship- yard. I understand that the government still addresses the work from a project- by-project point of view. Yet one would think that there are benefits in things like purchasing equipment common to many classes of ships if a program ap- proach was pursued. Is the Government considering moving to a more program- focused approach? We're trying. We strive to manage NSS as a program of work. However, to date, our results have been mixed. It's a reality that our approaches are still primarily project focused. Each project is executed within its framework of approvals and contracts to design and then build the ships. We're working with the shipyards to establish common terms and conditions across those contracts, building on past experiences, and we have had some good successes in this area. There has been some commonal- ity of equipment between projects, but it hasn't been extensive by any means. Our horizontal program management has been more successful in higher level issues, such as managing production gaps risks.

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