Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/1159607
www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2019 21 arCtiC Members of the Arctic Response Company Group from 38 Canadian Brigade Group moves toward the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry during a relief in place (RIP) conducted on Exercise ARCTIC RAM in Resolute Bay, Nunavut. Photo: DND. R hetoric is not policy until it is reflected in government documents and actions. Comparing the United States and Canadian Arctic military strategies reveals that there is much more in common than different, disproving the rhetoric that paints Canada and the United States as adversaries. Despite dissentious comments by U.S. Secretary of the Navy Spencer threatening freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) 1 through the Cana- dian Northwest Passage or U.S. National Security Advisor Bolton promising the U.S. Coast Guard will have "year round persistent presence in the polar regions" or former Canadian Prime Minister Harper's "use it or lose it" remarks, those statem- tents are not reflective of what the men and women of both militaries and Coast Guards actually do in the Arctic to make it safe and secure, nor what the policies of the respective countries actually outline The U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard (sub-executive agency of the Department of Homeland Security) 2 have both released new Arctic strategies in 2019, and the Canadian military outlined its Arctic plan in the 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure and Engaged (SSE). While the bellicose rhetoric of the U.S. adminis- tration versus the near silence of the cur- rent Trudeau government suggests the two states would have very different poli- cies, there is far more that is common than different in their Arctic strategies. First, all three list "strengthen rules- based order" in the region as one of the top priorities. This not only includes en- suring that national sovereignty is protect- ed but, importantly, that the shared Arctic "depends on Arctic nations constructively addressing shared challenges. Regional co- operation – built on a bedrock of interna- tionally recognized principles like national sovereignty – is in the U.S. [and Canadian] interest and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic." 3 All three policies recognize the importance of the eight Arctic states and the cooperation that currently exists in the region among allies and partners. Related to the need to maintain rules, the U.S. and Canadian militaries both as- sume it is inevitable that traffic and inter- est in the Arctic will increase as the region becomes more ice-free. SSE specifically notes that "state and commercial actors from around the world seek to share in the longer-term benefits of an accessible Arc- tic."4 All three downplay any language of a "race" to the Arctic; instead, the rise in activity will evolve naturally as a function of better technology and less ice. There- fore, ensuring "[a] stable and conflict-free Arctic benefits the United States [and Canada] by providing favorable conditions for resource development and economic activity, as well as contributing to uphold- ing the international order and regional cooperation on challenges that affect all Arctic nations." 5 While Canada specifically references "climate change," the United States prefers terms such as "the warming of the Arctic" and "changing physical envi- ronment." And yet, it is the USCG which is the most blunt and descriptive of the ef- fects of climate change noting that: "[T]he warming of the Arctic has led to longer and larger windows of reduced ice conditions. In 2018, Arctic sea ice remained younger and thinner, and it covered less area than in the past. The twelve lowest summer minimums in Arctic ice extents in the satellite record have occurred in the last 12 years." 6