Vanguard Magazine

Vanguard October/November 2019

Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR

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22 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2019 www.vanguardcanada.com sPAce 2007 by the Chinese military using a "ki- netic kill vehicle," which rammed the satel- lite at over 16 km/s. The resultant explo- sion created approximately 3,000 pieces of debris that continue to pose a danger to spacecraft in LEO. More recently, on 27 March 2019, India successfully executed an anti-satellite test at an altitude which it claimed to be low enough that any debris created would be burned-up on re-entry into the Earth's at- mosphere. The test created more than 400 pieces of debris, with at least two dozen fragments being ejected upwards past the International Space Station (ISS). Indian officials have provided an abundance of in- formation on the test, and claimed the test was a "historic feat" and the nation is now in an elite club of "super space powers" along with the U.S., Russia and China. The Kosmos-2251 and Iridium 33 col- lision was another collision event, al- beit accidental. Launched in 1993, Kos- mos-2251 was a 950-kilogram military communication satellite operating in LEO since 1995, while Iridium 33 was a com- mercial communications satellite. The col- lision occurred at a speed of 42,120 km/h in LEO above Siberia. The US SSN cata- logued over 2,000 large debris fragments resulting from the collision. Two of these events, the Chinese and Indian tests, were particularly detrimen- tal to the safety of spacecraft. Both events were irresponsible as the anti-satellite tests were not formally communicated prior to launch and conducted with no declared active debris removal plan in place. Fol- lowing the United Nations (UN) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, both events have also increased the risk of collision through the intentional destruction of an on-orbit spacecraft and created long-lived debris. In addressing the space debris problem, international norms of responsi- ble behaviour in space must be addressed. Canada, DND and the timeliness of a Debris Removal Mission Prior to the proposal call, the DND, like most space operators, had relied on the "Big Sky" theory to deal with space debris. Space was a big place, and the likelihood of two objects colliding was exceptionally small. As space becomes more congested, contested and competitive, reliance on the Big Sky theory has become untenable. DND has maintained a long partnership with the United States Air Force in sup- porting space surveillance activities, dating back to the 1950s when they operated the Baker Nunn Satellite Tracking cameras in Cold Lake and St-Margarets from the mid- 1950s to mid-1970s. DND continued to support space surveillance activities over the years, most notably through deploy- ments to U.S. space surveillance sites. In 2013, DND again began providing data to the U.S. space surveillance network via the Canadian Space Surveillance System (CSSS). The centerpiece of the CSSS is the Sapphire satellite. Launched in 2013, Sapphire supports space object tracking of Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and GEO space objects. While Sapphire fills an important gap in Canadian and allied space capabilities, by itself it does not provide enough data to support space debris tracking and situ- ational awareness. By providing a unique niche capability to the SSN, Canada has maintained privileged access to the most sophisticated space object catalogue in the world. With the planned Surveillance of Space 2 project, Canada will continue to provide a capability to the SSN, thereby continuing to support future space sur- veillance requirements, including a debris mitigation or removal mission. Supporting DND's commitments to the SSN, the Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) policy outlines several initiatives that would support a space debris removal mission. The SSE states that a space debris mitiga- tion mission would significantly support DND and CAF's commitment to defend and protect military space capabilities while assuring freedom of access to space. More- over, integrating a prototype space debris removal capability into Canada's space ca- pabilities responds to the requirement to produce cutting-edge research and devel- opment on new space technologies. Such a mission would be technically challenging and precedent setting. A debris removal capability not only supports the SSE and Canada's national security commitments to the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), but also the United Nations' Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. A debris removal mission would allow Canada to promote its national interests, including the peace- ful uses of space and demonstrably pro- moting norms of responsible behaviour in space by example in debris mitigation. Anticipated Space Debris Removal Methods Canada does not operate a space debris re- moval capability. Indeed, it has been noted in the recent call for ideas that "[t]here are no operational debris removal capabilities in use, globally, and existing prototypes lack important capabilities and have prov- en ineffective." A debris removal capability not only supports the SSE and Canada's national security commitments to the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO), but also the United Nations' Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. Sapphire satellite. Photo: MDA Corporation

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