Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com DECEMBER 2019/JANUARY 2020 31 CYBER Israel – are the main current protagonists, but Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States are other key players in the ongoing power struggle. The Gulf States – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qa- tar and the United Arab Emirates – are like a hem sewn on the edges of the Ara- bian Peninsula, which is dominated by Saudi Arabia. One of the Gulf States in particular sticks in the craw of the Saudis. This is Qatar, one of the world's largest producers of natural gas and enormous- ly wealthy, the home of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and the sponsor of the con- troversial TV network Al-Jazeera. The Al-Thani family that rules Qatar originally came from the desert in the 18th century from an area that is now in Saudi Arabia, and there are still elements of tribal rivalry with the Saud family. More recently, Qa- tar has challenged Saudi hegemony in the region, particularly through the coverage of controversial issues by state-controlled network Al-Jazeera, which has been ac- cused of promoting terrorist groups. Sau- di Arabia has broken diplomatic relations with Qatar on more than one occasion and in 2017 did so again, closing its air- space to Qatar airlines, seeking a pan-Arab boycott on docking by Qatari ships, and closing its land border with Qatar. Qatar turned to Iran for support (notwithstand- ing the presence of the USAF at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar). When you are talking about the Middle East, things are com- plicated, and alliances and loyalties shift rapidly. As part of their "punishment" of Qatar, the Saudis blocked Qatari websites, in- cluding Al-Jazeera, and banned Al-Jazeera channels from hotel distribution in the Kingdom. The Saudis wanted Al-Jazeera shut down, but that hasn't happened. In fact, Al-Jazeera stuck the knife in by re- lentlessly covering the shocking murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. The land bor- der remains closed, and there are rumours that the Saudis intend to make the block- age permanent by digging a canal across the Qatari peninsula to sever the state from the Arabian mainland. This probably won't happen, but it gives you an idea of the de- gree of tension, and to what measures the Saudis are prepared to resort. The air and sea blockade – which has not been success- ful – continues. In other words, the two states are engaged in ongoing forms of hy- brid warfare. Into this mix, we now throw sports and broadcasting. The leading sports channel in the region is the Qatari-based network BeIN Sports. BeIN is a global network op- erating in the Middle East and North Af- rica, France, Spain, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, Hong Kong, and several countries in south-east Asia. It is interesting to note that it was formerly known as Al-Jazeera Sports. Ac- cording to BeIN's website, it has "disasso- ciated" from Al-Jazeera, but while legally separate, many still consider it to be part of the Al-Jazeera Media Group. Its exact rela- tionship to Al-Jazeera today is a bit unclear. BeIN has been active in acquiring rights to many sports, in particular the most popu- lar sport in the Middle East: soccer (aka football). It has a terrific line up, includ- ing UEFA championships, English Pre- mier League, Spain's La Liga, Germany's Bundesliga and other top-calibre soccer. It is a must-have for football (soccer) fans and was widely available in Saudi Arabia until the 2017 Saudi-Qatari rupture. Now ask yourself: given the "no-holds barred" state of Saudi-Qatar relations, plus the fact that Saudi Arabia has more than ten times Qatar's population, is the Sau- di leadership going to let a Qatari sports channel get rich by providing must-have sports coverage to the millions of Saudis who follow soccer? No way. The Saudis are accustomed to getting their own way. But the problem is that BeIN sports has tied up all the broadcast rights, so even if there was a decent Saudi sports channel – which there isn't – the rights for the Middle East have been sold to the Qataris. So the only solution is to (a) block BeIN sports to the extent possible so that it can't reach Saudi consumers or (b) pirate the signal and dis- tribute it to Saudi (and other) audiences. This will damage BeIN's business, but more importantly, it will strike back at the Qatari regime. But like much in hybrid If BeIN Sports and Qatar are not happy about the current state of affairs involving widespread content piracy by BeoutQ, the same can be said for the sports leagues who are concerned that one of their best customers has lost a large chunk of its market to a rogue operation.

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