Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2020 19 interview HMCS Windsor exchanges passengers with HMCS Fredericton using a Zodiac during Canadian Fleet Operations. Photo: DND submarines (U.K.) between 1986 and 1992. They were originally envisioned to be a class of 12 or more conventional submarines, but the build program was truncated to four, and then the conventional submarine ca- pability in its entirety was divested by the U.K. Ministry of Defence as part of their Strategic Review process in the early 1990s. Canada's 1998 decision to acquire the Vic- toria-class as a replacement for the aging Oberon-class was advantageous from an ac- quisition point of view in that we acquired the submarines at a fraction of the cost of a new build program. However, the sup- ply chain has proven to be more difficult to manage than I think anyone would have reasonably foreseen at the time. Where there were more than 20 Oberon-class sub- marines in operation with five different navies, there are only four Victoria-class submarines in operation, and Canada is the only user. The difference in scale is im- portant since the economics of providing support to an 'orphan' class of submarines differ substantially from the economics of providing support to a relatively common and widely-used class of submarines. While there is some commonality between the diesel-electric Victoria-class and the U.K. Vanguard-and Trafalgar-class nuclear sub- marines, there are many items unique to the Victoria-class where Canada is the only user. Additionally, while some of the origi- nal U.K. industrial support base remains available to supply and refurbish parts for legacy systems, a significant fraction has moved on to other work, gone out of busi- ness, or can deliver services to the Victoria- class but at prices and with schedules that reflect the complexity of interrupting their routine business to do so. This means that, in many cases, legacy system spares take longer and cost more to source and/or service than had ever been the case in the Oberon era, and the effect is to influence costs higher and availability lower. Secondly, the Canadian capacity to maintain the Victoria-class is limited. The submarines were not built in Canada, and while technical data was transferred to Canada and training was provided un- der the terms of the Upholder purchase agreement, experience is much harder to transfer. Except for a few brave British souls who migrated to Canada largely as a consequence of the Victoria-class acquisi- tion, most of our maintenance know-how for the Victoria-class is homegrown – resi- dent in our shipboard maintainers, in the RCN Fleet Maintenance Facilities, and in the Victoria In-service Support Con- tract (VISSC) Prime contractor, Babcock Canada. We do have the ability to reach back to the UK for technical assistance, but the reality is that the people who knew the Upholder-class in British service are for the most part retired, and many of the companies that contributed to the build program have moved on. Canada is thus largely on its own when it comes to maintenance of the Victoria-class, and our maintenance workforce is both limited in number and armed only with the experi- ence of maintenance done in Canada since the submarines arrived here. This tends to drive maintenance cost and schedule per- formance, especially in an environment where getting it wrong could result in the loss of a submarine and its crew at sea. The third and final challenge relates to the age of the submarines. At the time that Canada's Oberon-class submarines were withdrawn from service, they were only a few years older than the Victoria-class is now. Despite their age, however, the Victoria-class submarines are in relatively good condition having benefitted from a moderate usage profile to date and an excellent standard of care from our vari- ous maintenance service providers. This provides a reasonable foundation upon which to base a decision to continue to safely operate the Victoria-class for years to come while ensuring that we invest ap- propriately in their upkeep. That said, cor- rosion, fatigue, and wear will continue as

• Cover