Vanguard Magazine

SUBMARINES www.vanguardcanada.com AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2020 15 was the determining factor in the decision not to proceed. 8 Often when costs of nu- clear submarines are publicly cited, they re- flect the unit cost to build a particular type of submarine, but they do not address the total costs of naval nuclear power. There were some other factors that influenced the decision process - let me explain: • Infrastructure – regulations authorizing the operation of nuclear power plants are understandably quite demanding, and all associated infrastructure must meet exceedingly high standards of construc- tion to allow for extremely unlikely sce- narios (e.g. a massive earthquake at the moment of withdrawing a reactor core). This is coupled with heightened security arrangements, as well as, extensive edu- cation and training programmes for all those involved with nuclear propulsion – the latter must be routinely re-certi- fied to meet regulatory standards. As no western navy has had a major nuclear ac- cident since the inception of naval nucle- ar power in 1955, the stringent certifi- cation process has absolutely no latitude for negligence. 9 • Intellectual Property (IP) – if Canada were to acquire nuclear-powered sub- marines it would not independently de- sign a new naval nuclear reactor, rather it would licence this technology from an allied nation. The authorization for the release of this technology would not be something Canada could control nor could it own the IP – it would be up to the host nation to dictate terms and conditions. While Canada oper- ates civilian nuclear power stations us- ing a CANDU reactor, it is important to understand that the PWR in use in submarines is completely different to the Canadian CANDU reactors and is not interchangeable. In short, while Canada has resident expertise in civilian nuclear power, it does not have the domestic expertise to design, build and operate naval nuclear reactors, which would be prohibitively expensive to develop. 10 The Dilemma Understanding that it is very unlikely that Canada will invest in nuclear-powered submarines the question remains as to how will Canadian submarines patrol in all three oceans that border Canada? Much has been written of late of the evolution of non-nuclear submarine AIP, however, the fact remains that no AIP system in service today can meet the power require- ments for long transits and prolonged op- erations beyond the ice edge. So, one may ask who will develop such a system? Nations that operate nuclear submarines have invested considerable sums on nu- clear infrastructure and are unlikely to be interested in funding development of an alternate power source. Conversely those nations that have developed non-nuclear AIP are nations that routinely operate their submarines close to home with easy access to supporting infrastructure and their na- tional supply chain. By not having to go far from home and not having to oper- ate under ice, the current AIP systems are adequate to meet the patrol requirements of these smaller submarines - but they are not reflective of the demands of Canadian geography. 11 Simply put, Canada requires a larger submarine than currently is in ser- vice with most navies, except those with BEST DEFENCE, BEST VALUE! NOVEMBER 16 & 17, 2021 bestdefenceconference.com

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