Vanguard Magazine

tion, for there are two components rooted in the concept of innovation; most of us are content to settle only on the first. We understand that which is innova- tive is new and may include a not so novel idea we decide to apply differently. Con- vincing others to buy into the new idea, or the different way leads to diffusion of the innovation. Therein lies the second component – implementation. It is in the implementation that potential innova- tions tend to meet up with barriers, some fatal. We find support for this two-tiered conceptualization of innovation from Jon Guttman and his 2014 monogram titled, Fighter Aircraft Combat Debuts, 1915- 1945: Innovation in Air Warfare before the Jet Age. Guttman explains innovation in terms of the technical enhancements that are made, but also emphasizes how the political status and circumstances de- fining the primary conflicts of the era led to improvements in aircraft design. This approach to innovation may be helpful, as we prepare to confront the selection of Canada's next fighter. Ironically, the sense of being locked into that label itself feels like a barrier to implementation and a po- tential failure to innovate. impeding innovation In Lawrence Freedman's The Revolution in Military Affairs (1998), the author re- veals what lies beyond Kachur's economic reference point, hinting at some of the things that impede innovation. The Cold War had ended, budget cuts ensued, and a quest for innovative ways and means be- gan in earnest. An "opportunity to think about the shape of armed forces over the longer-term presented," Freedman wrote, "but a radical restructuring process did not arise. Distinctive services remained beholden to their functional environ- ments, and equipment improvements were conservative, and did not exhibit any 'complete break from the past.'" To sum- marize, it seems possible the victory that was the Cold War delivered some creativ- ity but also complacency from conquest; the kinds of things that impede innovation grew ever more institutionalized. Understanding innovation Large-scale aircraft procurements have tended to unfold in conservative risk- averse ways. The evolution of aircraft has tended to follow a path of logical incre- mentalism, rather than the radical innova- tion path. Analysis of the three contenders vying to replace Canada's CF-188 Hornet is an opportunity to hone our understand- ing of innovation, to appreciate all of the factors and barriers arising. Alas, the pro- cess is understandably mired in challenges that can expose our short-sightedness. Innovation should encourage us to look beyond functionalism and, in this case, consider more widely how and to what ex- tent the successor to our current Hornet and the organizations that will employ it, can respond to emergent security devel- opments. Guttman referred to "political status and circumstances," and that points toward the need for some foresight and alignment with our national strategy. In Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, author Stephen Rosen (1991) argues that "understanding the process of innovation, rather than any particular change to weapons (things), or- ganizations (people) or tactics (ideas), will be key to winning future wars." In the present context, this would seem to en- courage us to focus beyond claims to de- ploy effectively any late 4th or emerging 5th generation technologies, like stealth or active-electronic-array radar devices. Instead, the process of innovation em- phasizes also the platform's adaptation to an evolving external environment, and the relative ease with which it can be con- tinuously re-integrated by the air force organization the restructuring of which should be anticipated in response to an ever-evolving security environment. Those familiar with the concept of strategy will probably recognize these subtle references to the essential elements of external adap- tation and internal integration. To illustrate, the emergence of the com- bustion engine, mobile radios, and the air- plane in combination Rosen describes, "as a significant revolution in military affairs of the 1920s and 1930s, that contributed to the development of naval aviation." It would be regrettably inaccurate to simplify all of that as "the advent of the carrier" since doing so could mean we overlook either how society responded to these developments or what society may have been telling us as regards what it needed. Another revolution followed in the 1950s, "when ballistic missiles and nuclear weap- ons together offered unprecedented means of inflicting immense firepower on the en- emy," which contributed to the need for helicopters and airmobile battlefield con- cepts, but also played a significant part in the development of the nuclear submarine innovation www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2020 13 A CF-18 Hornet in flight during an air combat training exercise for Squadron 425 pilots from Bagotville. Photo: DND T he context that brought about the end to the Cold War is a case in point. Certainly, many understand during the Cold War one side was better at something, than the other appeared to be. Those who believe so, often invoke in- novation as the source of advantage. But our history pursuing innovations provides mixed messages suggesting quite often we don't fully understand what we mean by innovation. A lack of foresight and an inef- fective strategy certainly won't help either. two Components of innovation In the August/September 2020 issue of Vanguard, Ralph Kachur seems to ascribe to innovation failures a lack of understand- ing of or appreciation for the innovation's "benefit to Canada." He is right to link economic circumstances and outcomes to the meaning of innovation. In their intro- duction to Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies (2000) Andrew H. Van de Ven and Harold L. Angle explain, "innovation requires more than the creative capacities to invent new ideas; it requires managerial skills and tal- ents to transform good ideas into practice." It is these managerial skills, across all of the relevant sectors, that require more atten-

• Cover