Vanguard Magazine

innovation www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2020 15 70+ LOCATIONS in communities across Canada 315,000+ HOURS in-flight training for the RCAF since 2005 4,700+ PILOTS Graduated from Phases I-IV (NFTC and CFTS Programs) 1,000,000+ HOURS of aircraft maintenance work done annually 14,000+ CANADIANS employed across the full SkyAlyne Team national fighter aircraft industry going forward; 3) from a socio- cultural perspective, the extent to which each can help shape not just the air force but the armed forces of tomorrow in terms of how each option can engender an interest in military service, es- pecially in the air force. A March 30, 2012 article by Paul Koring published in the Globe and Mail argued in support of the status quo employing an ex- tremely shallow and unhelpful approach to the analysis of the government's preference for the F-35. Had we applied his very narrow-minded logic in 1982, 40 years later we would have little to no experience with precision munitions, would most prob- ably have been unable to participate effectively in the Gulf War (1990), and the Libya Campaign (2011), simply because the con- tinued use of the 1950s and 1960s technology would have placed our air force personnel at tremendous risk. More recently, our CF-18-enabled "presence" in eastern Europe has indeed served to discourage an increasingly provocative if not menacing Russia. Thankfully, some foresight and much diverse analysis contributed to a decision to prepare Canada for continuing collaborative con- tributions made possible by the late 1970s decision to select the McDonnell-Douglas F-18. Political, Economic and Socio-cultural Perspectives From a political perspective, Canada's ability to thrive in the glob- al marketplace, to exploit our own natural resources everywhere, and to defend same, without undue risk to Canadians remains un- derstandably paramount. The menace that is Russia just happens to be not just on our border, but also seems to be very interested in expanding their own presence in the Arctic, if not elsewhere. It seems with each passing week, yet another provocation is inflicted on one or more of our allies while operating over international territory. There are others, too, whose interests do not align with our own, and whose activities elsewhere are increasingly just as pro- vocative as our traditional foe. It would seem there will be oc- casions going forward that call for our support of allied efforts to contain some of this aggression, and our ability to do so first without revealing where we are, and, secondly, seeing targets and firing on them before they see us, would seem to be rather im- portant. These are the kinds of capabilities offered not by all three contenders to the same extent, per se, but certainly better by one over the others, or so it would seem. From an economic perspective, Canada's aerospace industry is equally invested in both the Boeing firm and the Lockheed Mar- tin Corporation. Care must be taken when deciding on which of the three fighters to buy. Why? Because it is important to un- derstand the consequences to this component of the aerospace industry of choosing one firm over the others. In terms of strat- egy, not long ago the corporate world recognized the role played by the firm's core competencies, to assuring their position in the market. The firm's competitive advantage, it seems, was in good measure attributable to some key people employed therein, and the skills they brought to the job. Experience of the firm, it turns out, derives from specialization which itself derives from decisions to develop competitive advantage in specific product areas where the firm's R&D efforts have concentrated. In The Cutting Edge: A Half-Century of U.S. Fighter Aircraft R&D, (1998) authors Mark Lorell and Hugh Levaux explain of the 14 fighter aircraft firms in place at the end of the Second World War only a handful had the system-specific expertise in fighter

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