Vanguard Magazine

28 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2020 www.vanguardcanada.com submarines rent effect. They also have a strategic im- pact, well above their small size. In launching Australia's Strategic Up- date and Force Structure 2020 in July , Australian Defence Minister, Linda Reyn- olds CSC said: "Submarines are fundamentally impor- tant to our defence strategy. They are a unique – and powerful deterrent to any adversary, and they are critical to protect- ing our national security interests. Subma- rines secure Australia's strategic advantage – through leading-edge surveillance and the protection of our maritime approach- es. " ... "Our submarine capability – un- derpins Australia's credibility and influ- ence as a modern military power." Canada needs to decide if it wishes to possess a viable operational submarine ca- pability and if so, how to achieve it. The Standing Senate Committee on National Defence recommendation for the acquisi- tion of 12 submarines split between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts would be a good starting point. Similarities in Requirements There are many similarities between Australia and Canada's requirements of their submarine force. Both must oper- ate over long distances, often across re- mote stretches of ocean, and master the complexity and expense of two ocean basing. Canada's requirement to operate in a third ocean, the icy Arctic is unique. Conversely, Australia operates northward into very hot, tropical waters. These re- quirements point to a larger submarine than those used by many of the Western European Navies. The Attack Class proj- ect to design and build 12 large conven- tional submarines for Australia provides some indication of the time scales to be expected. The Project was initiated in late 2008, the Defence White Paper 2009 called for 12 regionally superior, conventional submarines to be built in Australia, as argued in a submission from the Subma- rine Institute of Australia. An exhaustive and protracted review of options followed to confirm that no suitable off the shelf submarine existed and a bespoke design would be required. In 2016, the French company, DCNS (now Naval Group) was selected to begin the ab initio design pro- cess, which is due to deliver the first op- erational submarine in the early 2030s; ex- perience with ab initio submarine projects says it could well be later. Lessons Learned The lessons learned from Australia's ex- perience with the Collins Class project are well documented and could provide some useful input to Canada's considerations. To summarise some of the lessons drawn from RAN submarine experience, includ- ing rectifying the Collins Class transition. A force of four (next generation) subma- rines should reliably provide one deploy- able submarine (and occasionally a second for a short period) in a single ocean basing scenario. Four submarines are spread too thinly for a two-ocean basing situation. Note, the Netherlands operates four submarines, utilising a multi crewing re- gime (typically three crews across two op- erational SM), with a good level of shore support and a focus on crew respite, pre- dictable deployment cycles, and close at- tention to conditions of service, to achieve one deployable submarine and a second available occasionally. Unlike the Cana- dian requirement, this is a single ocean basing situation and with shorter-range deployments. Canada's current defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged commits to operate and maintain the four Victoria Class sub- marines, but makes no mention of what might follow. If, as seems reasonable, Canada requires a two-ocean submarine capability, able to provide at least one sub- marine deployable at long ranges on each coast, then at least four submarines and three, preferably four crews, with appro- priate infrastructure, shore support, and basing would be required on each coast. Finally, given the timescales involved in a delivering new submarine capability, there is no time to lose, as Admiral McDonald points out in a recent interview: "that con- versation and effort regarding Victoria- class replacement have to happen soon". In the interim, an effort to build up crews and experience, possibly utilising a similar model to the Netherlands for bas- ing, crewing, and upkeep would be a good starting point to achieve a steady-state op- erational capability and baseline for a fu- ture transition, that is, should a decision be taken to renew the capability? The upcoming Deep Blue conference in October is intended to help get discus- sions going amongst Defence and Indus- try about the acquisition of a sustainable, operational Canadian submarine capa- bility. I look forward to exploring these points further with you during my keynote speech and Q&A period that follows. References: 1. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/graphs-week- finally-getting-collins-class-paid/ 2. https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles- view/release/3/3881/australia-deploys-upgrad- ed-submarines-%28dec.-14%29.html 3. https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/Sub- marineWorkforceSustainability.pdf 4. https://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/ Coles_Report_Final_22Nov12-9-7738.pdf 5. https://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/ Coles%20Beyond%20Benchmark%20Report.pdf 6. The Canadian Defence Review , Volume 26, Issue 4, p10. 7. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-subma- rines-for-australia/ 8. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/ lreynolds/speeches/speech-australian-strategic- policy-institute 9. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/commit- tee/421/SECD/reports/SECDDPRReport_ FINAL_e.pdf 10. https://www.submarineinstitute.com/userfiles/ File/SIA_DWP2008_Submission.pdf 11. The Collins Submarine Project – Steel, Spies and Spin, Peter Yule and Derek Woolner, Melbourne University Press, 2012 12. http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-de- fence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report. pdf 13. https://vanguardcanada.com/ DeepBlue2020 Peter Briggs had a 40-year career with the Royal Australian Navy specializing as a submariner. His service included two sub- marine commands, Squadron Command and leading the team established to intro- duce the Collins-class submarines. Later, as President of the Submarine Institute of Australia, he led the public arguments to double Australia's submarine force to 12 submarines and remains a regular contrib- utor to the public debate on this program. In retirement, he led the Silent Anzac proj- ect to protect, preserve and tell the story of Australia's World War I submarine HMAS AE2 and the search to find and examine her sister ship, HMAS AE1 lost off Rabaul in 1914. RAdm Briggs retired from the RAN in 2001 and has since maintained an ac- tive interest in naval matters. He was also the Chairman of the AE2 Commemoration Foundation Ltd and the Finding the men of AE1 expedition in 2017, which successfully located the wreck of the lost submarine.

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