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16 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com nAVAL ways. In one CGAI paper, I provided such a comparison between the procurement processes employed in Australia and Cana- da in the CSC and Hunter projects respec- tively, both of which selected the Type 26 as the parent ship design . Whereas the HLMRs may be similar among nations, the unique nation require- ments can complicate comparisons. In the case of CSC, these warships must accom- modate many roles within one platform which some of our allies address with two or more ship designs (e.g. USA, UK, and Australia). They also have different envi- ronmental requirements (e.g. operations in the Arctic), regulations, and protocols for conducting operations (e.g. flight op- erations). Some nations direct the inclu- sion in new platform acquisitions of major equipment systems already in their inven- tory or highly subsidized by governments. Only the most rigorous comparisons take such considerations into account. But there are many other challenges in benchmarking. Such analyses often occur at an early stage where there is great uncer- tainty in the artefacts being compared. Cost comparisons frequently suffer from 'apples to oranges' figures in terms of what is in- cluded in project cost data and what is not, the impacts of different economies of scale, and the effectiveness of the working relation- ships between clients and suppliers. Paramet- ric models as employed by the Parliamentary Budget Office attempt to address such con- siderations. However, in all cases, ship design and construction schedules dramatically af- fect cost estimates but are notoriously diffi- cult to predict for warships before the first ship is actually delivered. From an internal benchmarking per- spective, DND has generated a scheduled target for projects to attempt to meet – two years for SoR finalization, two years to award a contract, and five years to complete delivery. Having worked dili- gently to get to the stage where the RFP was released on many Army and Navy weapon system platform projects, I would suggest that the application of this bench- mark for Canada's major defence acqui- sitions under the current processes and dispersed responsibilities is unreasonable given the levels of complexity and appro- priately enhanced degree of scrutiny. To have expected CSC to achieve this 4-year standard would have been imprudent. Ta- ble 1 lays out the milestone progress for CSC. In the aforementioned CGAI paper, I demonstrate how the schedule duration to get to the competitive selection of a preferred bidder in the Australian Hunter Class project was not very different. Nevertheless, I understand the concern that the CSC project was announced in 2008 and no ship is likely to be delivered before the mid-2020s. Delays also could introduce significant additional costs to keep the City Class Canadian Patrol Frig- ates in service until the first CSCs are available. And from experience, time lost cannot be made up to any great degree without introducing risk-laden disrup- tions or undesirable outcomes. Nor was credibility maintained by the continual an- nouncement of delays based on premature schedule guesstimates as often required by government contract approval processes. As in the past, those charged with execut- ing and overseeing CSC today are focused on doing everything practicably possible to avoid further delays. So What? The future of the RCN's capability to meet assigned government missions is signifi- cantly vested in the CSC project. As such it is essential that the CSC project be suc- cessful in delivering capable warships. But an essential enabler is the credibility of the project over time. This is no small task in the Canadian con- text which includes the perennial low opin- ion that many have of military procurement in general. We have seen the impact that lost credibility can have on delayed major defence projects in the past decade, on one occasion leading to outright cancellation. I remain hopeful that the CSC Project Office will be allowed to enhance the un- derstanding of all stakeholders including the citizens of Canada by employing time- ly periodic updates on project status. And for those of us on the sidelines, patience will be essential to enabling appropriate dialogue based on truth so as to avoid en- gaging in fiction. References: 1. Naval News, Xavier Vavasseur, 9 Nov 2020 2. CGAI Paper, Another Way to But Frigates, Ian Mack, November 2019 This article is a condensed version of a paper published by the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) available at the following link: https://www.cgai.ca/ launching_the_canadian_surface_ combatant_project Rear-Admiral Ian Mack (Ret'd) joined the public Service in 2007 as a Director-Gener- al with portfolio responsibility over a decade for NSpS/NSS and seven major capability projects destined for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army. Now retired from a second career, he resides in the Ottawa area. Table 1: CSC Milestones Achieved

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