Vanguard Magazine

20 APRIL/MAY 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com NORAD tinental defence effort to detect, deter, and defend against or defeat threats from all domains remains to be determined, but the Canadian Arctic will inevitably factor heavily given that the polar region remains the shortest and fastest avenue of approach to North America for various delivery systems emanating from major power competitors. Experts also concur that Canadian initiatives will require cre- ative thinking and new approaches about infrastructure, surveillance and detection, interception capabilities, and command and control relationships – but there is no evidence of any high level political atten- tiveness to the need to reconsider defence and deterrence in Canadian Arctic and in broader geostrategic context. The United States, NORAD Modernization, and a New Strategic Direction? "As the Arctic makes up a large portion of the air and maritime approaches to North America, Canada will continue to work in close partnership with the United States to ensure that we remain secure in North America by being positioned to deter and defend against threats to the continent, including from our Northern approaches. The binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the strong relationships fostered through the Tri-Command structure which includes NORAD, Canadian Joint Operations Command, and United States Northern Command, remain as relevant for con- tinental defence today. Canada remains firmly committed to modernizing NORAD with the United States to meet current and future threats to North America…" — ANPF Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (2019) NORAD plays a central role in the pro- tection of North American security and has always been closely associated with Arctic defences. General Terrance O'Shaughnessy, the former commander of US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the North American Aerospace De- fence Command (NORAD), told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on readiness in March 2020 that "the threats facing the United States and Canada are real and significant," and that "the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they are now avenues of approach for advanced conventional weapons and the platforms that carry them." He elaborates that: "The Arctic is the new frontline of our homeland defense as it provides our ad- versaries with a direct avenue of approach to the homeland and is representative of the changing strategic environment in our area of responsibility. More consistently navigable waters, mounting demand for natural resources, and Russia's military buildup in the region make the Arctic an immediate challenge for USNORTH- COM, NORAD, our northern allies, and our neighboring geographic combatant commands, U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. By fielding advanced, long-range cruise missiles - to include land attack missiles capable of striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory - and ex- panding its military presence in the region, Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland defense capability and capacity. In the meantime, China has taken a number of incremental steps to- ward expanding its own Arctic presence." As a solution, O'Shaughnessy empha- sizes the importance of advanced sensors that can "detect, track, and discriminate advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and small unmanned aerial better information sharing with partners and allies, and more integrated land, air, and maritime capabilities to project force in the region. The emphasis on enhancing surveillance and control of aerospace and maritime approaches to North America, as well as Canadian sovereignty territory, wa- ters, and airspace in its Arctic, points to an integrated, layered system-of-systems. In this model, several elements – including the Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Nanisivik refuelling fa- cility, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Ca- nadian Rangers, and fixed- and rotary-wing overflights – will contribute to all-domain situational awareness. Flowing from these capabilities, the Government of Canada seeks to reinforce public confidence that the Canadian Armed Forces are trained, equipped, and ready to serve the interests and needs of Canadians in the region. Strong, Secure, Engaged also explains that "the re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence," emphasizing that "NATO Allies and other like-minded states have been re- examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional mili- tary capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a 'near-peer.'" In light of advanced technologies and capa- bilities that adversaries can use to strike at North America from multiple directions and across multiple domains, NORAD has turned its focus to "all-domain" awareness, faster processing, analytics, and sharing of data, improved command and control, and enhancing targeting capabilities that can allow decision-makers to respond "at the speed of relevance." Canada has com- mitted to modernize the North Warning System (NWS) and to include the air and maritime approaches to North America, and is developing new space-based systems to track threats over the horizon, improve situational awareness, and improve com- munications globally – and with specific application throughout the Arctic region. The full extent of its contribution to con- In this model, several elements – including the Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Nanisivik refuelling facility, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Rangers, and fixed- and rotary-wing overflights – will contribute to all-domain situational awareness.

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