Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com APRIL/MAY 2021 45 Fundamental Challenges THE LAST WORD BY TROY J. BOUFFARD I n recent years, commentators have engaged in a growing dialogue about the need for an Arctic col- lective security forum that bridges the divide between Russia and the West. Russia's signal of interest in such a mechanism has prompted various interest- ing proposals about how to consider such an organization. Some commentators be- lieve that NATO should be the default lead for such efforts. Others consider that tra- ditional organizations, like the Arctic Se- curity Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and the Northern Chiefs of Defense (NCHoDs), offer a natural path forward. Such associ- ated proposals fall significantly short in ap- preciating current realities. Furthermore, the reasoning behind these propositions seems embedded with Western bias. This short note explores two core issues about the potential for a new or renewed Arctic collective security mechanism, namely 1) problematic assumptions about Russia, and 2) presumptions involving Western organizations. Analysts often find it difficult to specifi- cally contextualize Russian Arctic military capability and in what context(s) it aap- plies. Russia's combined year-round Arc- tic military capacity far exceeds that of the other Arctic states, but it is unclear what leverage that gives it as an Arctic player. Given Russian capabilities, a growing at- tentiveness to defence dynamics in the Arctic region remains appropriate. Even though NATO and U.S. military power remains superior overall, its applicability to influence Arctic affairs is limited given Russia's focus on national defence and do- main control rather than kinetic intent to project power vis-à-vis other Arctic states in an Arctic context. Russia is not a cen- trist state geopolitically. Rather, it thrives on the peripheries, where the Kremlin can justify authoritarian governance as critical for protecting its citizens and interests. Russia can and does consider, as well as manages, select topics in various external spheres as separate. For example, follow- ing the post-Crimea annexation, Russia fully expected the West to separate the event from matters involving manage- ment of the circumpolar Arctic and other international affairs. There was no conflict THE POTENTIAL FOR ARCTIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY: over Russia's behavior in Crimea, and there is no reason to believe there would be conflict over Russian's behavior in its Arctic – particularly given that Russia has been developing a justification for total control of its Arctic for many years. The first fundamental challenge in any discussion about a collective Arctic secu- rity effort involves the Russian position: there can and will be no productive, pur- poseful, or meaningful Arctic collective security without Russia. To think other- wise indicates a lack of understanding the security environment of the Arctic region as well as Russian interests, priorities, and capabilities. Knowing this position means that Russia can largely dictate the terms of any collective Arctic security arrange- ment. Much Western thinking completely bypasses this reality, leading to various false conclusions. Assuming that Russia will happily join whatever forum that the West proposes is arrogant and misguided. Stakeholders should reflect on Russia's call for military experts to conduct Arc- tic security dialogues. It is doubtful that Russia did so to foster Arctic good will Canadian Armed Forces prepare for long- range patrols in Resolute, Nunavut as part of Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT 2019. Photo: NATO

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