Vanguard Magazine

40 JUNE/JULY 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com help," when adoption of the Treaty de- grades Canada-U.S. defence cooperation, causing the U.S. to defend Canada with- out its consent to ensure the security of the continent. Canada's own national defence policy is also undergoing revision in the evolving strategic context, with a shifting approach to the detection, deterrence, and defeat of threats to Canada, the continent, and allies abroad. Adopting the Treaty would disrupt efforts to ensure the "secure in North America" and "engaged in the world" components of Canada's 2017 de- fence policy Strong Secure Engaged. The TPNW is not without merit. Its con- ception and support among 51 nations re- flects a frustration with the delays and road- blocks pursued through the NPT process and mechanisms for reducing nuclear num- bers, controlling destabilizing systems, and moving towards disarmament. The failures to achieve FMCT negotiations through the Conference on Disarmament created a deadlocked process in which Canada has called for reform. The TPNW states that it is "concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nu- clear weapons in military and security con- cepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on pro- grammes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons." At the Canadian domestic level, support- ers of the TPNW include political parties such as the NDP, Green Party, Bloc Quebe- cois. In addition, a number of former Min- isters signed the "Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" on September 21, 2020: "we appeal to current leaders to advance disar- mament before it is too late ... By claiming protection from nuclear weapons, we are promoting the dangerous and misguided belief that nuclear weapons enhance secu- rity ... Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is underway, and a race for disarma- ment is urgently needed." The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT's negotia- tion — the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China — apparently view it as a license to retain their nuclear forces in per- petuity. Instead of disarming, they are in- vesting heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable. Although arguing that the NPT is fall- ing short of its disarmament objectives, the TPNW does reaffirm that "the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- ons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security." Nuclear arms control and disarmament expert Paul Meyer stresses that the TPNW comple- ments the NPT and argues that banning nuclear weapons alongside chemical and biological weapons conventions allows the Treaty to fill a legal gap that otherwise treats nuclear weapons as different from other WMDs. This initiative would indeed fit with Canada's Weapons Threat Reduc- tion Program, but the question remains how to get it done credibly in line with Canada's national security and defence in- terests involving alliance politics, the US, and the defence of North America. Canada has adapted to the realities of the threat context and alliance politics, requir- ing the employment of different methods to achieve more tangible results in NACD. This adaptation is observed in a quieter dip- lomatic approach by Canadian government officials in engaging its allies and states of proliferation concern. This methodology aligns with U.S. national security interests in which Canada acts on behalf of the U.S. interests in engaging in quiet diplomacy through Global Affairs with North Korea to encourage the state to disarm. In a December 2016 diplomatic mission to free a detained pastor, a four-person Ca- nadian delegation "pressed North Korea to abandon its quest for a nuclear arse- nal." This mission, intended to encourage North Korea to return to Six Party talks, is reported to have been highly secretive and consisted of three days of meetings with North Korean veteran diplomats. Canada had access to Pyongyang at a time when the United States did not and used this op- portunity to express its "strong concerns" about the nuclear and ballistic missile tests conducted by the North Korean regime. In the fall of 2018, Canada hosted high-level North Korean officials to discuss issues of human rights and its nuclear weapons pro- gram. A five-person delegation from North Korea met with Canadian bureaucrats to discuss the lack of "concrete actions by North Korea towards denuclearization." Reports indicate that this visit was arranged with the "blessing" of the U.S. and allies demonstrating a unified approach to pres- suring North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal. Moving forward can we expect Canada to engage in more of these quiet diplomatic activities at the behest of its U.S. ally, alongside multilateral disarmament ini- tiatives within the NPT framework? Canada's values and NACD goals have not changed, but Canada has shifted in how it promotes them. Although Canada intends to continue to promote strategic stability through engaging in nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarma- ment, it is not in Canada's national interest to support a treaty that interferes with the NPT process and conflicts with emerging deterrence requirements for North Ameri- can defence and NATO commitments to allies in theatres abroad. Adopting the Nuclear Ban Treaty requires Canada to dispense with participating in deterrence, undermining both its role in North Ameri- can defence and NATO. Geographically, this may not be an option. Adopting the TPNW is a non-starter for Canada at this time. Canada cannot significantly alter its foreign and defence policy, which would create a negative impact on commitments, posture, relationships, and geographical po- sition. Rather than banning nuclear weap- ons today, Canada will continue with the incremental multilateral process through the NPT and proceed with adapting its role NACD to the new threat context. This article was previously published on Feb- ruary 3, 2021, on the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network and reprinted here by permission. Dr. Nancy Teeple is a member of the DND/ MINDS funded North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) and an adjunct assistant professor and re- search associate at the Department of Po- litical Science and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada. DEFENCE

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