Vanguard Magazine

Vanguard June/July 2021

Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR

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38 JUNE/JULY 2021 www.vanguardcanada.com shared nuclear non-proliferation and disar- mament objectives. We are committed to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons." Canada's preference to work towards dis- armament through the NPT rather than adopt the TPNW is the most recent indi- cator of a 20-year trend of a declining ac- tive advocacy for nuclear disarmament by the Canadian government. This decline coincides with an increasing alignment of strategic interests with its allies, particularly the United States. Explanations for why Canada has not joined the TPNW and ac- tively endorsed disarmament in recent times involve a complex set of variables, namely the interplay of actors and systemic features at the domestic and international levels of analysis since the 1990s. The evolving polit- ical-strategic context thus affected Canada's national interests relating to its foreign and defence policy and alliances in an increas- ingly uncertain and unstable security envi- ronment. What is notable is that Canada has not abandoned its commitment NACD but has adjusted its methodology in accor- dance with changing strategic realities, thus prioritizing arms control and non-prolifera- tion over disarmament. Canada had been a strong advocate for nuclear disarmament through the efforts by the Canadian government (Dept Ex- ternal/Foreign Affairs) and advocacy or- ganizations since the 1960s; and made a significant impact on banning other types of weapons (such as leading the Land Mine Treaty – 1997 Ottawa Convention). Cana- da remains a member of non-proliferation and disarmament working groups (such as the UN Conference on Disarmament, G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Nuclear Security and Contact Group). However, after the 1990s, the Canadian government shifted from active advocacy on NACD issues to a near-silence on dis- armament. The emphasis on disarmament was carried forward by Canadian orga- nizations dedicated to the elimination of nuclear weapons (such as Canadian Pug- wash Group, Project Ploughshares, Simons Foundation). Canada's decline in active promotion of global nuclear disarmament correlates with an increasingly unstable and unpredictable international security environment, including the rise of threats against the North American homeland since the events of 9/11. Canada's role in the Afghanistan mission, threat of WMD terrorism, Canada's leadership consider- ation of BMD participation (2005), and the renewal of NORAD in 2006 indicate Canada's shifting focus on other immediate priorities. The US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002, which was "based on the premise that if either superpower constructed a strategic defense, the other would build up its offensive nuclear forces to offset the defense" creating conditions for "a never-ending offensive-defensive arms race," saw little response from the Govern- ment of Canada. In spite of declining its participation in Missile Defence, Canada has always left the door open to reconsider this option in the future. Missile Defence plays a significant role in continental defence and the deterrence posture of the U.S. and the question may be revisited in Canada with the modernization of North American de- fence under the SHIELD concept with NORAD renewal. Although a politically and cost-sensitive matter, the reality – as stated by James Fergusson – is that "The United States cannot defend itself without Canada and we can't defend ourselves with- out the United States." Official statements on Canada's foreign policy affirm that its values are promoted as national interests. However, Canada has a history of contradictory views about the role of nuclear weapons for credible deter- rence through its defence establishment in contrast to its commitment to strategic sta- bility through promoting nuclear arms con- trol, non-proliferation, and disarmament through Foreign Affairs. The latter reflects a normative agenda through multilateral means (via the NPT) towards reducing nu- clear weapons to their eventual elimination: Canada's policy on nuclear non-prolifer- ation and disarmament is built around the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and reinforced by related initiatives ... Can- ada strongly advocates for non-proliferation and a step-by-step approach to nuclear dis- armament. This approach involves having all states join the NPT, bringing the Compre- hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Canada's values on stability through nu- clear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament have not changed, but how it pursues them has shifted to a quieter approach in line with US national inter- ests. Therefore, a key question to consider is what are Canada's national interests in adopting the TPNW rather than working through the NPT? Canada's national interests involve being a credible defence partner through its alli- ances and acting as an influencer through bi- and multilateral partnerships. Canada's national security and defence relies on co- operation with the United States, benefit- ting from the protection of the U.S. "nu- clear umbrella," in addition to the missile defence systems in North America (which Canada may join in the future) and in Eu- rope (NATO), which Canada supports. At the International level, the security challenges facing Canada and its allies have become more complex and unpredictable – the international system is more unstable with the rise of great power competitors, rogue nuclear weapon states, new domains integrated into evolving defence/deter- rence architecture, evolving offensive nucle- ar and conventional delivery technologies. Canada's alignment with U.S. and allied priorities are a hedge to guarantee security now and into the future. Joining the Nucle- ar Ban Treaty would be akin to denounc- ing the U.S. strategic posture which ensures Canada's security. Canada's relationship with the U.S. and NATO would be jeopar- dized by an outright call for banning nucle- ar weapons and Canada would be perceived as an unreliable defence partner. At Cana- da's expense, attention would be drawn to its contradictory position of condemning nuclear weapon states while benefitting from their protection. Such a position on banning nuclear weapons would impose significant costs to Canada's interests in the defence of North America. Adopting the TPNW would create ob- stacles in options for Canada's role in the modernization of North American defence and NORAD renewal. This concerns what the future holds for Canada's role in the modernization of the North American de- fence architecture and Missile Defence. The Arctic is an "avenue of approach" for threat vectors against targets in North America creates a geographic challenge to Canada's joining TPNW. The question of whether Canada can remain a reliable defence part- ner will likely cause a revisit to whether Canada needs to develop "defence against DEFENCE Canada's national interests involve being a credible defence partner through its alliances and acting as an influencer through bi- and multilat - eral partnerships.

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