Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/139409
Shipbuilding S cades. Thus, the shipbuilding strategy would become an important driver of economic growth. Second, an important aspect of any procurement strategy is to assess the economic cost of the entire lifecycle of the equipment. Industry estimates that the maintenance and repair of the new fleet would cost approximately $500 million per year during the 40-year projected lifespan of the ships. By investing in its onshore shipyards, Canada assures that it will create the expertise (if we build them we can repair them more easily) and maintain a certain level of control over the future cost of maintaining the fleet. This is a strong economic argument that should not be overlooked. A foreign-based procurement strategy would subject the RCN, and by extension, Canada to extreme financial uncertainty where economic hiccups such as exchange rate boom and bust, shipyard closure, decision to relinquish maintenance operations, or variations in labour wages could essentially make the maintenance and repair of the fleet either impossible or unaffordable. A build-at-home policy will shield the RCN from the shadow of an unpredictable future. The last dimension relates to the navy itself. First, the buildat-home decision promotes Canadian operational sovereignty, mainly by giving the RCN the capacity to design, repair and conduct the maintenance of its fleet without relying heavily on allies or other nations. In the event of a conflict (although such probability appears remote for the moment), Canada must have the capacity to build, repair, train and maintain its navy. Reliance on allies to supply Canada with these tasks is extremely hazardous since these allies would probably (as they have done so in the past) satisfy their own material necessities before addressing Canadian issues. Second, we do not buy naval vessels the same way we might other military equipment. Ships are really a system of systems, small cities that are designed for particular tasks and capacities. In this context, countries tend to supply their navies with specific capacities that fit their particular strategic interests. In this HMCS Charlottetown conducting a boarding in the Northern Arabian Sea. Photo: Cpl Robert LeBlanc We do not buy naval vessels the same way we might other military equipment. Ships are really a system of systems, small cities that are designed for particular tasks and capacities. In this context, countries tend to supply their navies with specific capacities that fit their particular strategic interests. respect, the RCN needs specific ships that are able to conduct operations with international allies on open seas as well as defend Canadian coasts that have particular environmental requirements. To achieve such a high level of flexibility and reduce the security risks of espionage, the shipbuilding procurement strategy requires great coordination between the RCN and national industry. When you take into account the various political, economic and strategic dimensions associated with foreign versus onshore procurement schemes, one has to conclude that the decision to supply the RCN with Canadian-made ships is overwhelmingly preferable. Such an option will cost Canadian taxpayers much more than selecting off-the-shelf options. Nonetheless, proponents of the offshore solution often fail to give serious thought to considerations beyond the actual price tag. Policymakers, academics and military personnel should focus instead on the real problems associated with the NSPS. For example, there are clear indications that the government has underestimated the cost of the strategy. Furthermore, the NSPS suffers from a serious lack of strategic thinking in Canada. Military procurement is essentially a simple ends-means equation: you should purchase equipment to fulfill your task. Be that as it may, successive Canadian governments have failed in their responsibility to choose between alternative roles, asking the Canadian Forces to be prepared for all types of missions. In this context, the proper response from the CF when the time comes to acquire new material is to select equipment that is both the most advanced technologically (to survive on a battlefield), but also flexible enough to conduct all types of operations. The present plan to acquire Arctic offshore patrol ships is a perfect example of this strategic indeterminacy: a ship this is both capable of patrolling on open water (where speed is a principal objective) and of navigating in Arctic conditions (thus with some icebreaking capability). This "flexibility" incurs a number of technological challenges that remains one of the main price drivers of procuring military equipment and has the foreseeable problem of using state of the art equipment to accomplish mundane tasks such as patrolling coasts. This political indeterminacy of military ends has plagued all procurement processes in Canada since the mid-1970s and is probably the single most important factor behind our successive failure to purchase military equipment at a reasonable price. www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2013 41