Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/139409
shipbuilding s Importance of thermal contrast: Two soldiers on patrol at night, in winter (-23ºC) with winter camouflage and small arms at a distance of 1.8km: (a) the active imager clearly detects the weapons carried by soldiers; (b) the thermal imager does not reveal the weapons given poor thermal contrast. thermal contrast and sufficient ambient light levels, respectively. In absence of thermal contrast and in low-light levels, such as overcast nights or remote operational areas, active imagers figuratively and literally shine by enabling better surveillance. The AIMS system facilitates surveillance in several ways and is particularly useful to: • read ship lettering and aircraft wreck call letters at night; • detect objects based on their relative reflectivity (actively and passively); • see through windows and windshields at night, which is impossible with thermal imagers; • detect optical sights; • detect life-vest retro-reflectors; and • discriminate individuals carrying weapons. an electro-optical multi-sensing system in typical SAR missions. In addition to the statistical assessment, the team looks forward to proposing a practicable Contingency Operations Plan. Complementary imaging sensors, integrated into an operator workstation, offer a solution for operational airborne sensing requirements. The active imager excels at target identification and confirmation, and the thermal imager excels at target search and detection. When the information is properly collected and displayed to the operator, improved target detection and identification results. With its multi-channel, geo-referenced full motion video, the AIMS system may, ultimately, assist Canadian forces with procurement efforts and improve operational capabilities with enhanced situational awareness during SAR and ISR missions. While the project team has performed preliminary search concepts of operations, comparing imager types and sensor settings, an automated method for sweeping the search area remains to be determined. To this end, the National Research Council Flight Research Laboratory is leading, in collaboration with DRDC, a three-year project that will analyze the in-flight operation and effectiveness of This article was co-authored by Terry Rea, Nicolas Léchevin, Capt. Katherine Likuski and vincent Larochelle. The authors would like to acknowledge the following Canadian organizations for their contribution to the system development: DAEPM, Aerex Avionique Inc., CAE Professional Services, York University, Ontario Centre of Excellence. Continued from page 46 judgment about what it wants air power to do in the period from 2020-2040," a conclusion that would not appear out of place in Canada either. Even if every partner ultimately procures F-35s, every air force will become much smaller in the coming years given the rising costs of advanced air warfare. Commenting on the Dutch air force, IJ observed "the ambition to maintain the RNAF as part of the NATO A-Team currently looks unsustainable," a conclusion that was mirrored in other assessments of the Italian, Australian, Norwegian and Danish air forces in that publication. Modern air forces face a double bind: select the only air frame which guarantees the ability to operate in an environment dominated by the proliferation of information technology (and accept that you will not have enough of it to make any sort of contribution) or preserve a sufficiently robust force structure at the cost of being a reliable "full spectrum" partner in future expeditionary operations. Summing up, Fergusson writes, "the decision to maintain strike capabilities through the acquisition of a multi-role replacement platform to replace the CF-18 ensures that political, rather than capability, considerations determine Canadian decision-making with regard to the nation's role on the international stage." However, the expenses of preserving capability may have finally reached an apogee given the exponential growth of costs associated with modern air combat. The decisions that emerge from this side of the capability equation are unavoidably political and come at time when the government is under intense scrutiny regarding its own integrity. The Senate scandal will combine with pre-existing Canadian suspicions that the RCAF rigged the procurement process in the first place. In effect, the air force is now staring down the barrel of repeating the maritime helicopter procurement fiasco with its holiest of holies in terms of capability. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the Canadian Forces College or the Department of National Defence. www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2013 45