Vanguard Magazine

www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2021 21 ARCTIC strategic movement of naval assets includ- ing nuclear submarines from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic or vice versa. Given that the various routes through the Arctic Archipelago are not recognized as internal waters of Canada, there exists the possibil- ity that foreign submarines could claim the right of submerged transit without seeking permission because those waters are an in- ternational strait that provides the right of transit. This would be a clear challenge to Canada's sovereignty and security because Canada considers the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters using the strait baseline method established in 1985. If there was an accident affecting a nuclear- powered submarine in the Arctic Archipel- ago, the impact on the environment and local communities could be catastrophic. We must therefore be able to identify such activity to discourage any attempts and, if need be, take the appropriate actions to stop them. Detection under ice is difficult from above. Although long-range patrols car- ried out by CP-140 Auroras can drop sonobuoys in leads in Arctic Ocean ice, the opportunity is dependent on where the leads are. If a detection was made the pursuit and attack of an intruder under ice would be very difficult if not impossible. Arctic ice requires underwater sensors. My first exposure to underwater surveil- lance in the Arctic was as a staff officer in- volved with defence procurement in 1986. It was one of those projects to fill a de- ficiency that was part of the White Paper on Defence published in 1987. One of the concerns then was that Soviet submarines could launch ballistic missiles from polyn- yas in the Arctic Archipelago. Unfortu- nately, like the nuclear-powered subma- rines, it was short-lived! The need for underwater surveillance of the Arctic Archipelago was resuscitated by the Harper Government in 2006. The Defence Research Department Canada (DRDC) was given the task to develop a demonstration project called the Northern Watch Technology Demonstration Project (NWTDP). It was to affirm arctic sovereign- ty and security. The Project was going to test various surface and subsurface sensors with a focus on subsurface. In accordance with the DRDC June 2016 report, 1 the tests for underwater surveillance were con- ducted at Gascoyne Inlet, on the southwest corner of Devon Island, Nunavut. Over a period of some 10 years, it has successfully demonstrated the feasibility of installing a sonar array across one of the choke points. We have made significant arctic domain awareness progress in the last two decades. The most impressive improvement has been the use of RADARSAT I, RADARSAT II, and, presently, the RADARSAT Constella- tion to conduct surface surveillance from space. Given the size of the Canadian Arc- tic, especially when you include the Exclu- sive Economic Zone and eventually the extended continental shelves, surveillance from space is the most cost-effective way of monitoring surface activity in the Arctic. Our fleet of CP-140 Aurora has been re- cently upgraded and their suite of sensors would be most useful in the detection of surface and sub-surface activity. The North Warning System (NWS), that line of 47 air defence radar sites in the Canadian Arctic is active. Its long-range radars have recently been upgraded and planning for its replace- ment is ongoing. Many of its sites overlook the Northwest Passage and radar software modifications could include surface surveil- lance of vessels. The first Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS), the HMCS Harry DeWolf, has been commissioned and the second one, HMCS Margaret Brooke, has been delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy. Four others will follow to ensure a physical presence in the Arctic Archipelago during the shipping season. The Inuit Ma- rine Monitoring Program also contributes to surface surveillance of vessels. The miss- ing piece of the puzzle in terms of compre- hensive arctic domain awareness is the con- tinuous awareness of underwater activity. NORAD is in the process of reviewing its infrastructure. It already has a maritime alert warning. Underwater surveillance would be an essential addition to its com- prehensive domain awareness of the Arctic. In recent years, successive NORAD Com- manders have stated the need for better situational awareness in the Arctic. On 17 August 2021, during a session held at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), General VanHerck, the Commander of NORAD, in the context of arctic domain awareness, twice mentioned R ussia has been increasing its military posture in its arctic region. It has refurbished a number of its Cold War fighter bases, deployed air defence assets, grown its naval assets in- cluding nuclear submarines, etc. It has conducted large military exercises. It has resumed long-range bomber flights that come close to the NORAD air defence identification zone. It is developing of- fensive weapons such as hypersonic cruise missiles and glide vehicles. They are re- ported to have developed a nuclear-pow- ered, undersea autonomous torpedo and also have a long-range unmanned under- water vehicle (UUV) called Klavesin-2. A nuclear-powered unmanned and underwa- ter drone could potentially map safe routes through the Arctic Archipelago. Although Russia states that the Arctic should be a zone of cooperation its capabilities and ac- tions elsewhere are cause for concern and close monitoring. China is also becoming increasingly bel- ligerent and aggressive. Although its pub- lic policy statements sound reassuring, it cannot be trusted at its word given its re- pression of democracy in Hong Kong for example. China also ignores international law when it does not suit its purposes as demonstrated by ignoring a decision of the International Court of Justice in favour of the Philippines on matters related to the South China Sea. In the case of our two Michaels, China is not allowing consular access according to the Vienna Conven- tion on Consular Relations or even its own China-Canada Consular Agreement. The Chinese Sue Long icebreaker has recently completed a transit of the Northwest Pas- sage. Although China asked permission to transit with the aim of doing scientific research, they may have in fact principally done a reconnaissance of a possible route for their commercial maritime fleet and for their nuclear submarines. The Northwest Passage, which includes several possible routes, is an option for the A detailed view of Gascoyne Inlet Camp during the NW Demonstration field trial August 2015.

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