Vanguard Magazine

28 DECEMBER 2021/JANUARY 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com NORAD Ultimately, Canada and the United States will need to extend the kind of close co- operation, information sharing, and even response capabilities that currently exist in the aerospace domain to the maritime one. Tracking the growing number of ships in a warming Arctic will require better technol- ogy and integrated surveillance systems. Responding will also require a combined approach. In the Arctic, platforms are few and far between – and will remain so even after the promised Canadian and American icebreakers and patrol ships are online. Technical and Political-Military Considerations The adversarial advancements in missile capabilities have changed the calculus with regard to defence. Much like a reverse ver- sion of the Reagan 'Star Wars' program at the end of the Cold War, the developing cruise missile threats to North America could put the U.S. and Canada into eco- nomic circumstances of significant pres- sure that ultimately benefits adversaries. To make matters worse, area- and point- defence solutions against emerging threats and variants (such as hypersonic cruise missiles) barely exist – in concept or real- ity. Current missile defence systems do not seem adaptable to the developing threats either, given the speeds and maneuverabil- ity of advanced, longer-range hypersonic cruise missiles. Detection, discrimination, and intercept capabilities might require an entirely new defence enterprise. Moreover, the traditional problems of high-latitude communications persist. Modernized de- fence systems will require far more intense information needs. These fundamental problems are well-known issues to ad- versaries who understand that defending against and defeating advanced delivery systems may entail disproportionately high costs compared to the threat itself. Even if all threats and capability needs are well defined, resourcing is the essen- tial final step. North American defence in- volves responsibilities distributed between the United States and Canada. Both the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of National Defence (DND) share a variety of strategic mis- sions overseen by NORAD. Although this binational command is unlike any other multinational military organization, the command has its challenges. Leaders must carefully traverse the politics and security priorities of their respective na- tions. Such interaction can be understood effectively as part of a political-military composite defined as "the constructive and effective interaction between politi- cians – or more correctly, government ministers, – and their military advisers" involving a "process of balancing the ends to be achieved (as defined by policy) with ways and means available, including the development and application of ways and means to achieve the ends." Kiszely observes that "tensions between political leaders and military advisors can be wide- spread and suggest that the interaction between them depends on many factors, notably the society, culture, and type of government." For North American de- fence, the political-military relationship involves four main actors with regard to NORAD. For DOD/DND, the Of- fice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) / Ministry of Defence represent the lead military authority and manages the polit- ical-related affairs while the geographic combatant command USNORTHCOM / Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) manage the military component. While this may seem unremarkable and little more than military bureaucracy, the implications of this structure on bi-/national policy and funding clearly indicates the complexity and necessity of understanding the pol- mil aspect of NORAD. Conclusion The joint statement by the North Ameri- can defence chiefs articulates a clear po- sition forward concerning issues involv- ing extraordinary uncertainty. Although NORAD must modernize, the why re- mains evident while the how endures with difficulties. Developing adversarial threats and environmental security issues yet to be fully understood continue to frustrate progress towards modernization ambi- tions. Yet, despite the challenges, NORAD has maintained a historical record of effec- tiveness in providing continental defence and global maritime warning. To date, Canada and the United States have proven that two states can work together to con- sistently achieve superior results regardless of military and political differences. Some may think that today's emerging threats represent a game changer, likely beyond North American commitment and capa- bilities. Such sentiment has existed as long as the binational command. However, his- tory indicates that NORAD will continue to succeed in its mission to protect North America. Done together, the next step – and every step – represents a partnership of progress and binational resolve. Troy Bouffard is the Director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. He has been a defence contractor with NORAD/ USNORTHCOM since 2013. Adam Lajeunesse, PhD, is the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Canadian Arctic Marine Security Policy and an Assistant Professor at the Mulroney Institute of Government, St. Francis Xavier University. Today, Canada's RADARSAT constellation provides only episodic coverage while its subsurface research and development hit serious problems in the Northern Watch project. WINNIPEG, Manitoba - One of eight Inuit Marine Monitoring Program (IMMP) Automatic Identification System (AIS) sites in the Arctic. Photo: NORAD.

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