Vanguard Magazine

32 APRIL/MAY 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com CYBER-WAR water ports. Ironically, Western sanctions in the wake of the 2014 annexation made Ukraine even more important to Rus- sia's geoeconomic ambitions as part of a land route for energy exports. 3 Based on its goals, this type of complete cyber-war seems unlikely to be useful. This is not to say that cyber has not been used in this conflict; however, these activities have been used in different ways, as a support- ing activity of the war aiming to accom- plish the two main goals that cyber-activi- ties usually attempt to achieve: propaganda and disruption. 4 Cyber-attacks cannot gain territory, but they can disrupt the other side's operations, target infrastructure and civilians and affect public opinion during the process of gaining physical territory. 5 These operations are simply better suited to spreading disinformation and confu- sion and attempting to cause distrust and chaos, bolstering the conventional forces. What Cyber-Activities Have We Seen in This Conflict? Propaganda and disinformation have been widely employed in this conflict, and the reach of these activities has been global. Social media has played a role in conflicts before, though this truly global scale is unprecedented, especially among youth. Young Russian Tik Tok influencers posted videos with a justification of the invasion – all apparently following the same script. Young Ukrainians also took to Tik Tok, as well as other platforms such as Instagram, to post their own videos of updates. While many sincerely try to ensure their informa- tion is as accurate as possible, this is not al- ways easy – especially with just as many peo- ple deliberately spreading disinformation. Some examples include attempts to cause fear and panic; Russians found local Tele- gram chats and posted false warnings about upcoming bombings to scare citizens away. People created Discord servers for updating and commenting and livestreamed battles online in addition to news footage. Social media was not only used to spread infor- mation – whether it was true or not – but to boost morale and push narratives, and much of the information circulating on social media is in favour of Ukraine. Vid- eos and photos of President Volodymyr Zelensky went viral, from his impassioned speeches about defending the country to the end to posing with his dogs. There were photos of Ukrainian couples getting mar- ried on the front lines and citizens crowd- ing the streets wanting to get weapons and join the fight. In Russia as well, videos of Russians protesting the war and getting de- tained started to circulate, and Ukrainians posted videos of Russian soldiers surrender- ing or being captured. Disruption and espionage have been used by both sides, with Russia hack- ing government ministries and defacing Ukrainian websites even before the inva- sion. The most substantial cyber-attack so far, which has not officially been attributed to Russia at this time, is the hack of Vi- asat, a satellite communications provider, which impacted other European countries as well as Ukraine. The American company is still working to bring users back online and recently stated that they are still ac- tively defending the service from malicious activities. Russia has also actively blocked Western social media and created what is being called a "fake news" law to control the narrative at home. It's also threatened steep fines for Wikipedia if it does not re- move certain information about the war that it considers inaccurate. Meanwhile, Ukraine's volunteer hackers and other hacking groups, including the group called Anonymous, have also made progress in disrupting Russian government websites and services. So far, however, there have been no largely debilitating cyber-attacks on infrastructure, with the extensive dam- age done coming from conventional at- tacks and weapons. Will We See Cyber-War? For the foreseeable future, cyber-activities will likely remain in the realm of propa- ganda and disruptions of communications and services. In this conflict, complete cy- ber-war does not appear to be strategically useful, though cyber-activities including disinformation will continue. Disinforma- tion will remain a powerful tool, especially as digital propaganda techniques using ar- tificial intelligence become increasingly so- phisticated. The environment for cyber-op- erations and disinformation is increasingly complicated, which has been demonstrated in this conflict; the involvement of new ac- tors, ranging from youth on social media to private companies both large and small, to any civilians engaging with online content, makes for an environment impossible to control and potentially creating a variety of new targets in conflict other than states. Experts also warn that civilian infrastruc- ture will increasingly be a target of cyber- operations. Sensitive infrastructure, includ- ing nuclear weapons, is a serious concern that is especially difficult to discuss con- sidering its highly classified nature. While our interconnected systems are convenient, there is always a risk of compromise. The risk of cyber-attacks in retaliation for sanctions remains high, but being the first country to launch a complete cyber-offen- sive would probably be costly in many ways, and some experts believe it could even lead to the cyber equivalent of mutually assured destruction. It seems unlikely in the current circumstances that cyber-war will come to the West, but it is vital to have cyber-de- fences on high alert to prepare for any pos- sibility. Canada's intelligence agencies are Propaganda and disinformation have been widely employed in this conflict, and the reach of these activities has been global. Social media has played a role in conflicts before, though this truly global scale is unprecedented, especially among youth.

• Cover