Vanguard Magazine

To keep pace with the evolving nature of conflict, Canadian combined arms groupings will need to continue to adopt a flexible approach to potential war-fighting deployments by adding more and varied weapons systems and mastering the associated tactics, techniques and procedures. ings will need to continue to adopt a flexible approach to potential war-fighting deploy- ments by adding more and varied weapons systems and mastering the associated tactics, techniques and procedures. Increasingly, militaries are augmenting their employment of: • UAVs of all sizes • Loitering munitions • Anti-tank guided missiles • Long-range precision artillery fires, and • Layered ground-based air defence sys- tems Each system is worthy of examination. As some are new to the Canadian Army, there is a corresponding doctrine and training load that cannot be disregarded but that falls outside the scope of this paper. UAVs Canada is no stranger to UAVs, in par- ticular armed U.S. Predators and Reapers, which the Canadian Army relied on exten- sively to destroy legitimate enemy targets in Afghanistan with minimal collateral damage. Additionally, the CAF deployed its own reconnaissance UAVs in Afghani- stan to provide overwatch and to assist in calling in other lethal fires from organic field artillery. What has changed today is the proliferation of UAVs, on a hitherto unknown scale. 5 The wide distribution of UAVs pushes a close-in reconnaissance capability to the lowest level of the combined arms team. Plagued for millennia by the nagging de- sire to know "what's on the other side of that hill," tactical commanders now have a simple, cheap solution at hand. Thus, an agile combined arms team can use the knowledge gained by forward deployed UAVs to direct and focus the lethal ele- ments of their team (infantry, armour [tanks], artillery and/or other joint en- ablers) to engage and destroy the enemy from an advantageous position. Akin to the propitious increase in the use of ma- chine guns by the armies engaged in the First World War, 6 UAVs are today's must- have equipment at all tactical levels and in ever-increasing numbers. Loitering Munitions Loitering munitions appeared initially in the 2010s and had a dramatic impact throughout Azerbaijan's decisive defeat of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh dur- ing their six-week war in the autumn of 2020. 7 The benefit of loitering munitions is that they are launched from beyond line of sight and can accurately destroy enemy elements ranging from entrenched soldiers to high-value, mobile air defence radars and missile launchers. Additionally, their relatively small size makes them difficult to shoot down while the noise signature of some models (Israel's Harop series, in particular) adds to the terror induced on targeted units, like the terror experienced by those under bombardment by Stuka dive bombers in the Second World War. Of note, the recent introduction of the U.S. Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost in Ukraine have been and will be important to destroying Russian forces in Ukraine. 8 Loitering munitions are cheap, simple and available to any nation willing to invest in this emerging capability. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles The direct-fire battle has been transformed in Ukraine by fire-and-forget anti-armour weapons. Such weapons (the U.S. Javelin is the current media darling, although there are others) have prompted some to sound the death knell of the main battle tank, given their vulnerability to these weapons. Historically, independent tank-only op- erations have often ended in disaster. 9 The lesson, neglected by some, from the war in Ukraine is that tanks are most effective when they are integrated into a balanced combined arms team and benefit from the mutual support of the other team mem- bers. Nevertheless, it is clear that fire-and- forget anti-tank guided weapons are devas- tating and should form an integral part of any combined arms team and in certain cir- cumstances can be deployed independently. Long-Range Indirect Precision Fires Disrupting enemy forces throughout the entire breadth of their footprint, including command-and-control nodes and theatre logistic networks, can effectively derail an enemy's military campaign. Deep fires (i.e., the ability to apply accurate long- range fire [100 km+]) from precision rockets can achieve these results. Such as- sets need assistance from all available in- telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Military ISR assets may in- clude ground-based counter rocket, artil- lery and mortar radars, long-range, large- surveillance UAVs (often referred to in the media as drones), a host of satellites oper- ating across the electromagnetic spectrum and/or aircraft with sideways-looking ground surveillance radar. 10 In addition to accelerating improvements in resolution from available military ISR assets, there is a remarkable amount of data on hand from commercial satellites and social me- dia from civilians in the battlespace. The challenge is to assemble these data into actionable intelligence and distribute it to the shooters in a timely manner. Do- ing so requires an intelligence system that draws on commercial techniques to sift the wheat from the chaff. Ground-Based Air Defence The threat of attack from above, even in a future case where the coalition enjoys air supremacy, requires layered air defence. Currently, systems range from radar-di- rected anti-aircraft guns through to so- phisticated surface-to-air missiles (exam- ples are Canada's retired ADATS in 2012 or the U.S. Patriot Missile System). These systems are optimized to engage enemy combat aircraft, larger UAVs/drones or helicopters. Countermeasures to the ever- growing threat of medium to small UAVs, armed or otherwise, are as nascent a field as the small UAVs themselves. Regardless, this proven threat, effectively employed in the wars in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, will require a defensive capability integrated into the combined arms team. Leadership and Morale All this talk of hardware might lead one to believe that limitless capital expenditures might be sufficient to render an army a formidable force. Alas, the opening phases of the war in Ukraine have disabused those who may have subscribed to this erroneous notion. For example, Russia had, and still has, virtually all the weapons necessary to field an army that fights in an all-arms team 20 JUNE/JULY 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com INNOVATION

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