Vanguard Magazine

18 JUNE/JULY 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com associated command and control inputs. All that being said, improved command and control is an empty gesture if there are no "forces" to command. The current RCAF commitment to NORAD relies pri- marily upon the aging CF-188 Hornet fleet in order to provide the "tip of the spear". Granted, the MND's NORAD modern- ization speech mentioned that Canada is in the final phase of the procurement process for 88 new F-35 fighter jets, along with the procurement of compatible advanced mis- siles. But the hard reality is that, even with all their advanced capabilities, the F-35 is effectively useless against ballistic missiles. Similarly, hypersonic weapons are likely in- vulnerable to any F-35 interception. That leaves F-35's only to potentially intercept intruding aircraft and / or cruise missiles. Completely absent from any of these lat- est announcements is any discussion of po- tential Canadian participation in the exist- ing US Ballistic Missile Defence program and / or any emerging technologies, such as directed-energy weapons. A directed- energy weapon (DEW) is a ranged weapon that damages its target with highly focused energy instead of using a solid projectile or explosive. This technology can include either lasers, microwaves, particle beams, and / or sound beams to target missiles. Canada currently possesses no theatre defence missiles or any other similar ca- pability. A Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system can be a trans- portable, rapidly-deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. In the Western world, besides the United States, both the United Arab Emirates and Israel have operational capabilities in this same regard. So, the time is now to have both an in- formed discussion and to plan for a way ahead in a comprehensive manner. En- hancing command and control and also using space-based elements to provide advanced warning is logically an "empty gesture" if there is no overall defensive capability. Similarly, there is no deterrent against launching an attack if it cannot be somehow defeated. US officials have now made it clear that they are not authorized to come to Canada's defence in the case of a ballistic missile attack. Because Can- ada is not currently a BMD program par- ticipant, decisions on when, where and whether to intercept an incoming ballistic missile are made not under the auspices of the binational NORAD structure but, rather, by the US alone, under its do- mestic defence command USNNORTH- COM. The same will likely be true for hypersonic weapons, given the potential technology needed to defeat them. In the 1960's, the RCAF relied upon a layered defence system with manned CF-101 Voodoos and unmanned Bomarc surface-to-air missiles in order to poten- tially intercept a force of conventional jet bombers. Although much maligned, the nuclear-tipped Bomarc missile capability provided an effective known deterrence, as well as a last line of defence against any bomber attack. A layered defence system is still applicable in today's context. F-35's by themselves are insufficient. As of May 2022, Defence Minister Anita Anand had indicated that Canada was per- haps examining the possibility of joining the United States' ballistic missile defence system, a re-evaluation that comes nearly two decades after Ottawa first rejected an invitation to participate in the BMD pro- gram. Whether it is a decision to finally par- ticipate in the US BMD program, or to acquire a national THAAD capability or even perhaps to further explore DEW technology, Canadian defence officials need to outline both a strategy and an implementation plan that can provide a credible defence capability. Otherwise, it does not make sense to spend billions on NORAD modernization and Canadian military space programs, without further considering, and then creating viable de- fence capability option(s). References: 1. https://www.canada.ca/en/depart- ment-national-defence/maple-leaf/ rcaf/2022/07/establishment-3-cana- dian-space-division.html 2. https://www.canada.ca/en/ department-national-defence/ news/2022/06/minister-of-national- defence-announces-canadas-norad- modernization-plan.html Terry Leversedge is a retired senior RCAF officer, published author and amateur historian. His career in military aerospace engineering encompassed a wide number of positions at both field units and within the headquarters of the RCAF, before he retired as a Brigadier General aer 35 years of service. COMMAND AND CONTROL Two CF-18 Hornets from 401 Tactical Fighter Squadron in Cold Lake, Alberta, approach a CC-150 Polaris Airbus from 437 Transport Squadron in Trenton, Ontario to conduct air-to-air refueling operations over the Canadian Arctic during the NORAD Exercise AMALGAM DART 21-2, on March 23, 2021. Photo: CANR NORAD.

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