Vanguard Magazine

30 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com information that Canada has decided to collect according to its priorities, especially in a changing world where reliance on for- eign intelligence from our allies no lon- ger necessarily serves Canadian interests. Indeed, as Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau argue, the information Canada receives from its allies often reflects the priorities and interests of those allies and not necessarily those of Canada. Some ar- gue that Canada has potentially missed out on important information for its decision- making, and that the opportunity to col- lect foreign intelligence would advance Canada's geostrategic, economic, military, environmental and scientific objectives. While not arguing for or against the cre- ation of a FHIS, Farson and Teeple exam- ined four options for Canada to develop a human foreign intelligence capability, none of which appear to be a solution. First, Canada could create a new institution, but the costs involved (estimated at about C$200 million in 2006, compared to the current C$500 million for Australia's for- eign intelligence service) would likely ex- ceed the country's intelligence needs – not clearly identified by the authors – and it is not clear that the creation of such a ser- vice would be well received by the public. Second, Canada could significantly expand the role of CSIS, allowing it to collect for- eign human intelligence and conduct clan- destine operations, but this would raise many legal issues, although they could be resolved. Third, it would be possible to add a foreign human intelligence com- ponent to an agency that already facilitate foreign intelligence activities, such as CSE. However, such an addition would run up against the particular organizational cul- ture of CSE, which exclusively focuses on signals intelligence. Finally, the last pro- posal would be to moderately expand the foreign intelligence powers and mandate of CSIS. Recently, several articles have been published that bring the debate over the creation of a foreign human intelligence service in Canada back to the forefront. While assumed that this debate, at least in the academic arena, was over, Hensler has reopened this debate by publishing an article examining Canada's foreign human intelligence service question, 25 years after he first spoke out in favour of such a ser- vice. The author begins by reviewing the long hesitation and evasiveness of various governments, both Conservative and Lib- eral, to address the issue, sometimes argu- ing that more studies are needed (when there are already enough), sometimes claiming that such a service would dam- age Canada's international reputation. For the author, not only is this not the case, but it reflects a lack of understanding by governments on what a foreign human intelligence service is and what it does. Finally, the main point of his argument, apart from noting that Canada would gain independence from the foreign intel- ligence it receives and that it could gain influence, is that Canada falls behind most of its allies, and that the creation of such a service would show Canada's allies, nota- bly the Five Eyes, its commitment to being on an equal footing and thus increase its prestige. On the other hand, over the past few months, numerous academic, journalis- tic and intelligence practitioner forums have also revived the debate. Some, with- out taking a position, remind us that it is time to seriously consider the question, as Canada is increasingly dependent on allied intelligence. Others point to the finan- cial and political costs of creating such a service and of engaging in clandestine es- pionage abroad. However, even if it is to enter the arena of international espionage, a foreign human intelligence service must be at least aggressive in its pursuit of valu- able information. The government must be prepared to support this aggressiveness and, above all, to take responsibility in the event of failure or leaks to the media. The arguments for the creation of such a service all focus on the defence of Ca- nadian national interests through the col- lection and analysis of foreign intelligence and the over-reliance on allied intelli- gence. The allies could indeed decide to terminate intelligence-sharing with Can- ada, although this seems unlikely at this time. Canada would need such a service to have a decision-making advantage, while advancing its interests on the international stage. For example, a very good threat and intelligence assessment of Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2002-2003 allowed Canadian intelligence to assess that there was insuf- ficient evidence to support this possibility. However, this correct intelligence assess- ment was made in the absence of an FHIS and on the basis of intelligence provided by allies. Against the Creation of a Foreign Human Intelligence Service On the other hand, many people are against the creation of such an intelli- gence service. For Robinson, this would be a considerably suboptimal policy choice for the Canadian government, as it raises many questions about the public account- ability of such a service while questioning the usefulness of this type of intelligence for decision-making. Indeed, there is no solid proposal currently to make clandes- tine operations accountable to the public, and there is no evidence to suggest with certainty that foreign intelligence has a di- rect impact on the choice of a particular policy. For others, the purpose of Canadi- an intelligence would not be to spy exten- sively on foreign countries to gain foreign policy advantage, but rather to protect Ca- nadian territory and people. Stuart Farson's 1999 contribution takes a similar stance on this debate. Accord- BACK TO THE FUTURE Headquarters of Communications Security Establishment (CSE, formerly CSEC) in Ottawa, Canada. Photo: wikipedia.org

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