Vanguard Magazine

32 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com BACK TO THE FUTURE ing to Farson, Canada would not need a foreign human intelligence service because all of Canada's intelligence needs are be- ing met. He identifies four areas of intel- ligence utility in Canada: business and commerce, national security, foreign re- lations, and international obligations. In the first two areas, business and national security, intelligence is directed inward. Political intelligence for foreign relations is already well provided by the network of Canadian embassies, which report a great deal of information that only needs to be better analyzed and disseminated. Finally, as for Canada's international obligations, it can rely on its main allies to obtain the necessary information. Moreover, one of Canada's concerns would be not to be a threat to the United States, which leads it to favour inward-looking intelligence. However, it could be argued that since 1999, Canada's intelligence needs may have changed, which will be the subject of the next section. Is It Time for Canada to Have a Foreign Human Intelligence Service? While we have seen the pros and cons of such an intelligence service, the main ques- tion remains: does Canada need it? Thus, even though Canada is largely dependent on its allies for foreign human intelligence, and that it would be advantageous for decision-making to rely on its own intel- ligence, it is not clear that Canada needs a new service for this purpose. Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau, who agree on the importance of decreasing dependence on foreign intelligence from our allies, all the while increasing Canada's ability to collect its own intelligence and produce its own analysis, propose to "Canadian- ize" Canadian intelligence. By this, the Juneau and Carvin intend mainly to im- prove the analytical capabilities within the Canadian intelligence community, while relying more on Canadian-gathered intel- ligence. Thus, there is no need to create a new intelligence service, but rather to increase the efficiency of existing services. This proposal is consistent with recent de- velopments in Canadian intelligence. For example, there has been an incremental evolution in the mandates and powers of CSIS and the CSE over the past twenty years. CSE now has the authority to em- ploy active operations in cyberspace, in- cluding the disabling of devices or com- puter networks that pose not only a threat to Canadian security, but also a threat to Canada's international affairs. For its part, CSIS now has a disruption and threat reduction mandate. However, this still applies to security intelligence and CSIS is prohibited from incurring physi- cal harm against any person. In addition, a federal judge recently authorized CSIS to conduct investigations abroad, even if the investigations violated the laws of the state in question, when dealing with threats to the security of Canada. While Canadian intelligence is still quite limited with respect to foreign intelligence, there are incremental developments that con- sider the contemporary context in which intelligence operates and are intended to make Canadian intelligence more efficient in its tasks. On the other hand, and without risking a hazardous prediction about the future of Canadian intelligence, it is unlikely that Canada will engage in such an in- stitutional creation soon. Even Hensler, an advocate of the creation of such an intelligence service, notes that Canada has an inherent aversion to foreign hu- man intelligence. Moreover, Canada's na- tional security culture is rather risk averse. Other recent research on the Canadian intelligence community has also come to similar conclusions, suggesting that the Canadian way of doing intelligence is not to engage in clandestine foreign intelli- gence gathering. Rather, Canada is said to have a defensive and minimalist intel- ligence culture, emphasizing the protec- tion of Canadian territory and people, while collecting foreign signals intelli- gence and contributing to a multilateral intelligence-sharing partnership. Conclusion Canada has a unique approach among its allies to foreign intelligence, understood not in geographic terms, but in terms of the nature of the intelligence collected. Canada has chosen to have a very lim- ited foreign human intelligence capability, while at the same time developing a signifi- cant foreign signals intelligence capability. This lack of foreign human intelligence has led many to argue in favour of an FHIS in Canada, whether this means creating a new intelligence agency or expanding the mandates of CSIS. For advocates of the creation of a FHIS, the advantage would be that Canada would decide what intelligence to collect based on its priorities and interests, rather Canada has chosen to have a very limited foreign human intelligence capability, while at the same time developing a significant foreign signals intelligence capability. This lack of foreign human intelligence has led many to argue in favour of an FHIS in Canada, whether this means creating a new intelligence agency or expanding the mandates of CSIS.

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