Vanguard Magazine

Given its conventional focus, Canada must address the growing strategic threat from the Arctic by accepting that fundamental limitation and reengaging with the USN to rebuild its Cold War Arctic cooperation. www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2022 25 ARCTIC have been here before. In the mid-1980s the Arctic Ocean emerged as a region of particular concern for the US Navy. The Soviet Union's development of the long- range SS-NX-24 cruise missile seemed to give their submarines the option of launch- ing a stealthy first strike against North American targets from within Canadian Arctic waters. From the 1970s onwards, there was also evidence that the Soviet Navy was beginning to use the Arctic as a regular transit route, allowing nuclear at- tack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to bypass the heavily monitored and defended Greenland-Ice- land-UK (GIUK) gap en route to patrol stations in the Atlantic. As part of its re- sponse to these capabilities, American na- val strategy underwent a significant and aggressive shift north. Articulated for the first time in 1984 by Admiral James D. Watkins, the "Maritime Strategy" was a broad concept for the global conduct of war with a focus on defeating Soviet sub- marines in circumpolar waters. While the Russian submarine force has shrunk considerably since the 1980s, its strategic interest in the Arctic remains the same. Today, Russia is again deploying new cruise missiles (such as the KH-101/102) with ranges of up to 5,500 km, enabling them to strike critical infrastructure across North American from firing positions in the Arctic. Carrying these weapons are new or refurbished Russian nuclear attack subma- rines (SSNs), which continue to be built and upgraded despite that country's failing economy and rapidly depleting (or seized) foreign currency reserves. At the same time, Russia continues to employ sea ice as cover for its SSBNs close to its shores. These are likely to be protected by SSN escorts, which would necessarily have to operate through- out the entirety of the Arctic ice cap. Thus, even though Russia would not need to send its SSBNs close to the Canadian side of the Arctic, its screening SSNs would need to do so in order to interdict potential Ameri- can or British SSNs approaching from the North American side of the Arctic. That strategic picture may also become more complicated than it was during the Cold War as China's growing interest in the region represents a potential long-term peril. A non-Arctic state with newfound polar aspirations, China has been invest- ing heavily in its naval power projection. Whether its Arctic interests, which centres on resource development, science, and shipping, lead to militarization remains to be seen. In the short-term, the motivation for China's first Arctic submarine voyage may well be the same as America's in 1958. It was at that point, in the face of the Sovi- ets' success with Sputnik, that USS Nauti- lus was sent across the pole as a demonstra- tion of American technological prowess. A polar voyage would send a powerful po- litical message, dramatically demonstrating to the world (and the domestic audience) that China is a first-rate technological power capable of the most ambitious and difficult global deployments. This would fall into the PLAN's pattern of growing overseas operations and the publicising of those deployments as symbols of state power. While a Chinese presence remains speculative, it is a serious enough consider- ation to warrant mention in the US Navy's new Arctic strategy: "Blue Arctic." Historically, the field of Arctic maritime defence has been dominated by the United States Navy (USN), given that it was the US that deployed the nuclear attack sub- marines needed to operate under the po- lar ice. Canada was largely absent since its diesel-electric Oberon- and Victoria-class boats lacked the extended range and genu- ine under-ice capability provide by nuclear power. Twice before, this limitation led Canada to seriously consider acquiring SSNs – once in the early 1960s and again in the late 1980s. On both occasions the technical difficulties and costs of building or acquiring these vessels led to the cancel- lation of the programs. The current acqui- sition program is unlikely to retread these same grounds. As the RCN looks to move the Canadian Surface Combatant pro- gram forward, the risk and costs involved in nuclear submarines will be prohibitive. As a useful comparison, the recent Austra- lian decision to procure SSNs in partner- ship with the US and the UK, has been costed at roughly $70 billion AUD (at a minimum). Canada is unlikely to take on this risk and is rightly focused on a diesel- electric option. Given its conventional focus, Canada must address the growing strategic threat from the Arctic by accepting that funda-

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