Vanguard Magazine

26 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com mental limitation and reengaging with the USN to rebuild its Cold War Arctic coop- eration. While this partnership with the US has often been considered a limitation, or even an affront to Canadian sovereignty itself, the reality is that it has worked well for nearly seventy years and can continue to yield positive results. Yet, cooperation with the US should not mean dependency and Canada must still be able to meaning- fully contribute. Contributing to the defence of the Arc- tic requires a modern submarine capability. While Canada is highly unlikely to acquire the nuclear-powered vessels that will en- able a true under-ice presence, conven- tional submarines offer essential capabili- ties along the ice-edge. While year-round access to the Arctic Archipelago is beyond the reach of a diesel-electric boat, the ef- fects of climate change are opening much of the region for longer stretches of the year. While that opening is unpredictable and subject to wild fluctuations in sea-ice coverage, the general trend is clearly an Arctic area that is increasingly accessible to non-nuclear submarines for longer stretch- es of the years. At the same time, that reduction in sea ice extent reduces the under-ice area in which SSNs and SSBNs can hide, mak- ing it potentially easier for SSKs to moni- tor under-ice access. As mentioned above, Russia maintains the practice of station- ing its SSBNs under ice. With Arctic sea ice retreating most rapidly on the Russian side of the Arctic Ocean Russian SSBNs and their escorting SSNs will move ever closer to the North American side of the Arctic. While a Canadian SSK may not have the endurance margins to safely tran- sit the ice-covered Canadian archipelagic waterways, it may be able to monitor such Russian assets from the more open waters on the east side of Greenland. Addition- ally, developments in autonomous Extra Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (XLUUVs) may provide a safer and more realistic solution to monitoring the Arctic underwater domain from the Canadian side. While UUVs to date have focused on only collecting information and monitor- ing potential targets, some defence com- panies have been developing miniaturized torpedoes that can be potentially fitted onto large UUVs that provide them with a prosecution capability. Engine technology has also advanced to the point where Canadian diesel-electric submarines can operate more effectively along the ice-edge. Developments in Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) tech- nology now provide a submarine with extended submerged range up to several weeks (depending on speed). This is ac- complished by virtue of having a sec- ond, but still finite, fuel source running through a reaction that does not require fresh air. The most prevalent example by far is the Sterling engine, which uses heat generated by pressurized combustion of liquid oxygen and diesel. This was first ad- opted for submarine use by Sweden in the late 1980s, and the technology has since been installed on all of their submarines, as well as in most of Japan's Soryu-class boats. More recently, fuel cell technolo- gies are providing an alternative to the Sterling engine, with benefits including greater acoustic quieting and less main- tenance at the cost of greater complexity. Regardless of the exact method by which AIP is achieved, its growing prevalence in non-nuclear submarines (SSKs) makes them increasingly suitable for long endur- ance underwater missions. The possibility of adapting AIP to Arctic use has been de- bated for decades but is becoming more pronounced as the technologies mature. In 2017, a Canadian Senate Committee even recommended serious consideration of AIP-equipped attack submarines for Arctic operations. These engines provide a partial solution to Arctic operations, al- lowing submarines to operate comfortably at the ice-edge while venturing into the icepack for a limited time. While conventional submarines now have greater access to the Arctic in sum- mer, submarines can still deny or monitor access outside of the open seasons by se- curing choke points. On the West Coast, access to the Arctic Ocean is through the narrow Bering Strait, in the East it is through Davis Strait. Submarines look- ing to transit the Canadian Arctic must travel through these narrow choke points and that requirement means surveillance of Canadian waters can be undertaken by watching the gateways – in partner- ship with the USN and other allied navies. While only a partial solution at the opera- tional level, this capability would provide strategic effect. Even seasonal access to the area, and regular operations around the ice-edge, would enable Canada to deny its enemies the use of the archipelago as a transit route while providing reliable sur- veillance of who was entering the region. As Phil Webster wrote in the Canadian Naval Review, "the mere presence of a Canadian submarine operating in … the chokepoints in the Northwest Passage, can have a significant impact in assessing underwater activity and the operations of non-Canadian submarines transiting or operating in these areas. The third point of access top the Ca- nadian Arctic is more open – across the Arctic Ocean from Eurasia. While Chi- nese access would realistically be limited to the Bering Strait, the Russian Navy is able to deploy freely into the Arctic Ocean from its Northern Fleet bases. Surveil- lance and defence of the Arctic Ocean and the Canadian High Arctic from this vec- tor would be outside the capabilities of a diesel electric fleet. It would be a mistake however to view operations in the choke points (where Canada can contribute) and operations in the Polar Basin (where it could not) in separate silos. The defence ARCTIC HMCS CORNER BROOK on arctic patrol during OP Nanook sails past an Iceberg. Photo : Cplc Blake Rodgers, DND

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