Vanguard Magazine

12 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2022 www.vanguardcanada.com SUBMARINE HMCSChicoutimi Faslane, Scotland. Photo: DND to actively participate in its own defence, it must be able to contribute integrated, interoperable, and interchangeable with our American allies along all three coasts, above, on, and beneath the ocean's surface. North America's most difficult threats, those form the sea, those meant to circum- vent NORAD's northward facing history, are managed best by submarines. The re- turn to a bygone era of strategic competi- tion between superpowers is a competition where Canada is a neighbour, an ally, a geo- graphic buffer, and given integrated infra- structure with the US, is seen by adversaries as a valid military target. This modern great power competition is a competition where victory looks like the status quo and where the pernicious effect of defeat will funda- mentally change our way of life. Since the 16th of February 1815 when the United States Senate ratified the treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, Cana- da's forces have only fought abroad. In the First and Second World Wars, Korea, Af- ghanistan and a myriad of peacekeeping op- erations, our ability to get from Canada to where we were needed was never in ques- tion. Shifts in geopolitics and advanced in precision, long-range weapon technology mean Canada can no longer rely on expedi- tionary forces to contain hostilities in far off lands. Over the past two decades, while we executed that exact strategy, concentrating on the capabilities, training, and tactics we needed to fight in failed and failing states, competitors invested, trained, and advanced their military capabilities. We remained fo- cused on forward operations – the way we always have. They focused on undermining our previously uncontested ability to move within, and deploy from, North America. Advanced technology, substantive invest- ment, and well-meaning treaties like Open Skies allowed competitors to target our most critical infrastructure. Canada and the United States are no longer sanctuaries, we are not immune to conventional attack – competitors have solved deterrence by ge- ography. With that, our ability to conduct operations far from home is no longer a guarantee, our ability to keep Canada safe solely by fighting abroad is gone. Canada's ability to deploy forces beyond our own borders can and will be contested by Russia or China with weapons systems that have already been used operationally and to dev- astating effect in Syria and Ukraine. Paradoxically, the threat to Canadian soil comes as no surprise, and a complete surprise, to the average Canadian. Since August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear bomb, Canadians have lived under the dark cloud of nuclear annihilation. However, it was known that a nuclear attack on North America would be met in kind. Mutually Assured Destruction kept a fragile peace. What has changed is that the country is now vulnerable to at- tacks below the nuclear threshold – from over the pole as well as from ships and sub- marines in the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific Oceans. The threat axis is all around. An attack on North America is no longer a desperate, suicidal act but rather a valid strategy designed to erode public will, frac- ture alliances, undermine power projection capability and create economic chaos. This is a widely publicized component of Rus- sia's strategic thought. To remain a relevant ally and partner, to continue to prosper from economic rela- tionships, the foundation of which is our shared responsibility for North American security, Canada must modernize its de- fences, including a robust RCN – on the surface and below. We must protect our ability to operate when and where we choose. Competitors and their current and emerging military capabilities have pushed Canada's national psyche towards the base of Maslow's hierarchy. Where we once worried about international esteem and exporting values, we must now turn to the basic needs of safety and security. As a result, Canada and the United States have embarked on a long overdue effort to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) a critical and necessary part of our shared defence. However, while absolutely necessary, the ability of competitors to strike from any point on the compass means that a robust north-looking defence network will not, in and of itself, be sufficient. Without a tech- nologically advanced, highly capable navy, including a leading-edge submarine fleet, Canada risks creating a 21st century Magi- not Line, including its false sense of security.

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