Vanguard Magazine

The ability to detect vessels approach- ing the Archipelago using these radars would allow the authorities to deny entry, confirm whether a vessel has reported to NORDREG, and corroborate whether or not it is transmitting the required AIS sig- nal. It is said that what you cannot mea- sure, you cannot manage. In addition, the report of the Senate Standing Committee on National De- fence identified another serious surveil- lance gap on page 38: "For witnesses, the main surveillance gap in the Arctic concerns the detection of threats and underwater activities. They underscored that Canada currently has no capability to detect submarines, underwa- ter UAVs or other types of submersible systems operating in the Arctic Ocean." Since our submarines cannot operate safely under the ice, one economical way to perform "the detection of threats and underwater activities" could be through the use of unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). Since the UUVs operate un- derwater, they could be deployed year- round, regardless of the ice cover. They would not have some of the disadvantages of sonar arrays on the seabed such as their vulnerability to damage from iceberg. A combination of short- and long-range UUVs could be used to monitor the un- derwater approaches to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The International Submarine Engineering Explorers UUV, with a range of 300 plus kilometers, could be deployed to monitor specific choke points. The long-range UUVs, such as the HUGIN Endurance from Kongsberg, with a range of 2,200 kilometers, could be deployed from Resolute Bay or Cam- bridge Bay to patrol the key vulnerable passages of the Northwest Passage. The UUVs may have the ability to lie down at the bottom of those passages and si- lently monitor activity. They could dock into unmanned underwater facilities to recharge their batteries, upload informa- tion and download instructions. By mov- ing from one underwater docking station to another, the UUVs could monitor all the approaches to the Arctic Archipelago. When needed, the UUVs would be com- manded back to a maintenance facility for servicing. The knowledge that UUVs are patrol- ling the waters of the Archipelago would be a great deterrent. In addition, while the UUVs collect national defence data, they could simultaneously be collecting scien- tific data, such as water temperatures, sa- linity, ocean currents and marine life (e.g., communications between whales). The changes to NORDREG regula- tions, as well as the deployment of HF- SWRs and UUVs, could quickly and significantly improve our arctic maritime domain awareness and deterrence. It is unfortunate that the lack of federal lead- ership on national defence, the reluctance to meet NATO minimum investment in defence, combined with the present gov- ernment's apparent disinterest in pro- tecting Canadians, will make the imple- mentation of those recommendations a challenge. Colonel (Ret'd) Pierre LeBlanc is a former Commander of the Canadian Forces in the Artic A R C T I C www.vanguardcanada.com JUNE/JULY 2023 21 International Submarine Engineering Explorer "For witnesses, the main surveillance gap in the Arctic concerns the detection of threats and underwater activities. They underscored that Canada currently has no capability to detect submarines, underwater UAVs or other types of submersible systems operating in the Arctic Ocean."

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