Vanguard Magazine

T H E LA S T W O R D 30 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2024 www.vanguardcanada.com has economic issues now, and is militarily bogged down in Ukraine, but could there be a resurgent Russia in the mid- or long- term? Recently, Russia has significantly increased its Arctic military infrastructure, command arrangements and force struc- ture. For example, the newly constructed Russian air force base at Nagurskoye is 500 kilometers closer to CFS Alert than our less-capable Air Force Forward Operating Location at Iqaluit! These enhancements would give a resurgent Russia an advan- tage in the Arctic if it decided to embark on another military adventure in say 10 or 15 years. Indeed, if one looks at Rus- sia's Ukrainian adventure, it's abundantly clear that it began many years ago, and only recently metamorphized into full- scale conflict. Another state that plays the long-game is China, and, while there's even less indication, there is, in Major- General Wright's phrasing, "the threat of a (Chinese) incursion into Canada's Arctic." Who can say what will happen in 15 to 25 years? Will Chinese fishing vessels start ille- gal harvesting in our Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arctic? Why are these seemingly long time- frames worth mentioning? Simply put, if you have very little military capability to- day to defend against an aggressor it will take that long to decide on an operational concept, procure equipment, and train sol- diers and units to do the work. Let's be clear. Canada does not have any real capability today to defend against an aggressor who attacks us on the ground. In addition to the Senate Committee report cited above, both the Auditor-General and the comparable House of Commons Com- mittee have reported recently on Arctic de- fence issues. 3 Tellingly, the focus of all three reports has been on air or maritime defence, and much of that focus has been on sur- veillance. Very little attention has been paid to the army, other than a passing mention of the very excellent work done by the Ca- nadian Rangers, a surveillance force that, it must be said, would be completely out- matched by Spetsnaz. Every recent initia- tive to improve Northern defence addresses our capability to observe and defend the air and sea approaches to our undefended bor- der: fighter aircraft, over-the-horizon early warning radar, patrol vessels and surveil- lance aircraft. Meanwhile, the army makes do with four very small Arctic response companies, less than 100 soldiers each. When these train, they generally focus on assisting civilian authorities, for example, dealing with a major air crash. They do not often, if ever, train for warfighting, let alone doing such in the Arctic They do not have adequate oversnow transportation. Most importantly, they cannot be delivered by parachute, and thus must land at the very airports that would be among the first in- frastructure an aggressor would destroy or seize. To be credible and effective, ground de- fence of our Northern border requires the following: First, a protective force to defend stra- tegic targets like CFS Alert but also vital infrastructure – airfields, telecommunica- tions hubs and power generation. Perhaps most importantly, this would deny an aggressor the opportunity to launch and sustain an incursion which distracts public, media and politicians from other impor- tant wartime tasks. The Army Reserves would be well-suited to this task: for ex- ample units from south-western Ontario could be assigned to protect infrastruc- ture in the central Arctic. Reserve units assigned to such duty could establish re- lationships with local residents, Canadian Rangers, and governmental services. They could reconnoiter their area, develop de- fence plans, and practice them regularly. Secondly, a manoeuvre force to respond to an arctic incursion. Some of this force must be deployable and sustainable by para- chute, including the ability to drop combat engineers and heavy equipment needed to construct an airfield on snow or ice. Given the North's vast distances and diverse ter- rain, once on the ground the force must have its own heavy helicopters which can be refueled in flight to extend their range and a complete suite of large oversnow vehicles capable of transporting soldiers along with all their equipment and supplies. Thirdly, air transport resources. We must regain the skills we once had for mass air- drops of troops, heavy equipment and supplies, such as a 12-plane formation ca- pable of dropping a battle group of about 1,000 soldiers anywhere in Canada. Finally, strategic infrastructure must be established to support arctic operations, for example in the Eastern Arctic at Iqa- luit, in the west at Inuvik, and centrally at Resolute Bay. This will position supply and other assets closer to likely operations, but more importantly move transport aircraft further north – the current C130 J model for example cannot airdrop a force into CFS Alert from its base in Trenton, On- tario, but could easily do so from Iqaluit, Inuvik, or Resolute Bay. To develop all the above, as mentioned earlier, requires time. You cannot decide 10 or 15 years from now, when CFS Alert or somewhere else in in our North is threatened or actually seized, that you need such a force. That decision must be taken now. Otherwise, Canada risks a 'come as you are' war, something that has severely hampered Ukraine as it defends its territory against Russian invasion. References: 1. Digitized copy, VHS tape of Global TV evening news, January 1987, in the possession of the author. 2. Senate Standing Committee on Na- tional Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs, Arctic Security Under Threat, June 2023, p. 25 3. Auditor General of Canada, Report 6 to the Parliament of Canada, Arctic Waters Surveillance, 2022. Standing Committee on National Defence, A Secure and Sovereign Arctic, April 2023. Greg Taylor was chief of staff of the Petawawa-based Special Service Force from 1985 to 1987 when it developed an innovative approach to defending Canada's North. HMCS Fredericton Photo: DND

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