Vanguard Magazine

30 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2024 www.vanguardcanada.com T H E LA S T W O R D notable increases in military expenditures since 2017, we chronically lounge at the bottom in any table showing what the allies are achieving. Canada is increasingly an out- lier among NATO allies in not meeting this commitment. As noted in the recently pub- lished CGAI paper, if done properly a com- mitment to actually spend 2 per cent repre- sents a "forcing function" which will require the government to be more effective. This may sound like a significant depar- ture for Canada. It is not. For example, when Lester Pearson was Prime Minister, Canada never spent less than 2.54 per cent of GDP on defence, and hit a high of 3.62 per cent. During the time of John Diefen- baker, defence spending went over 4 per cent. In comparison with what we have done before, 2 per cent is not extreme. The loss of political will to support pragmatic defence spending coincided with the end of the Cold War. Until 1989, defence spending was consistently over 2 per cent. While some may argue that letting defence spending fall was justified with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this position is no longer tenable. Canada benefitted from the "peace divi- dend" that came with the end of the Cold War, but we are now faced with a world that is increasingly dangerous and conflictual and we must reinvest to secure a new peace. Beyond Defence and ODA But investment in defence and ODA, while necessary, is not enough. All of the compo- nents of Canada's ability to interact with the world must be revisited and modernized. There are no equivalent internationally accepted "targets" for foreign policy/di- plomacy as there are for ODA and defence. However, we believe Canadians must sup- port increases here as well. A recent Sen- ate of Canada report on Canada's Foreign Service recommended that management be streamlined, greater expertise encour- aged and more Canadian diplomats be posted abroad. 2 Similarly, a report released recently by a group of eminent former U.K. officials suggested that a 1 per cent of GDP target for both diplomacy and aid would be an appropriate goal, to go along with the 2 per cent commitment to defence spend- ing. 3 This target is a useful benchmark for a similar conversation about the future of Canada's diplomatic capacity. Canada's security and intelligence com- munity is somewhat more opaque with re- gard to spending, but there is an emerging consensus that services such as the RCMP, CSIS, CSE and others within this com- munity require a critical examination of whether they remain fit for purpose and are adequately resourced. 4 Furthermore, the establishment of a foreign intelligence service is generating discussion and should be considered. As we make these critical investments, we must recognize the rapidly evolving nature of security. A changing climate means that the Arctic will be opened up for a variety of new uses and we must re-think what it means to "defend" it, as Minister of For- eign Affairs Mélanie Joly has recently stated. A rapidly transforming knowledge-based economy means that we must regard the collaborative R&D capacity of our universi- ties and industry in fields like AI, space, cy- ber and many others as strategic assets to be both developed and protected as a key part of any approach to national security. As we have seen recently off the coast of Yemen, non-state actors, armed with weapons that were heretofore unavailable to them, can wreak havoc on global trade. Conclusion The threats we face today directly affect the well-being of Canadians. All of them re- quire responses across the broad spectrum of our capabilities in terms of diplomacy, development assistance, intelligence and defence. As of today, we cannot meet these threats, or even make a serious contribu- tion to allied efforts to meet them which is in keeping with our national interests or with our status in the world. We are, by history and necessity, an Allied nation. As we benefit from our Alliances, so too must we be prepared to contribute to them. What is required urgently is a broad national consensus around the need for Canada to set serious targets and develop a plan to meet them in a clearly-defined and short time-frame. We recognize that these spending targets represent substantial in- vestments. We believe Canadians are ready to make them, if they properly understand the issues. Canadians have always risen to the challenge of defending freedom when they have been called to. There is too much at stake for us to fail to rise to that challenge today. Reprinted with permission, The Global Affairs Institute, June 2024 References 1. See, for example: Edward Greenspoon, Janice Gross Stein, and Drew Fagan, "Canada needs a plan for the U.S., no matter who becomes president. That starts with making us matter more," Globe and Mail, 27 April 2024, available at: https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/ article-canada-needs-to-have-a-plan- for-the-us-no-matter-who-becomes- president/; Rigby, V. and Juneau, T., A National Security Strategy for the 2020s; Report of the Task Force on National Security, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, May, 2022, available at: https://www.uottawa. ca/faculty-social-sciences/sites/g/ files/bhrskd371/files/2022-09/nat- sec_report_gspia_may2022.pdf; Shull, A. and Wark, W., Reimagining and Canadian National Security Strategy, Centre for International Governance Innovation, December, 2021, avail- able at: https://www.cigionline.org/ programs/reimagining-canadian-na- tional-security-strategy/; Gilmour, J., "Does Canada Need a New National Security Policy?" Canadian Global Af- fairs Institute, July, 2021, available at: https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_ need_a_new_national_security_policy 2. Senate of Canada, "More than a Vocation: Canada's Need for a 21st Century Foreign Service," Dec, 2023, at: https://sencanada.ca/en/ info-page/parl-44-1/aefa-canadian- foreign-service/ 3. "The World in 2024: Renewing the UK's Approach to International Af- fairs," 7 April, 2024, available at: The World in 2040: Renewing the UK's Approach to International Affairs | UCL Policy Lab - UCL – University College London 4. A recent report by the Business Council of Canada makes these points, particularly with respect to the ability of this community to safeguard Canada's economic interests in a changing world. See, Business Coun- cil of Canada, "Economic Security is National Security: The case for an Integrated Canadian Strategy," Sept 07, 2023, at: https://thebusiness- council.ca/app/uploads/2022/07/ Economic-Security-is-National-Secu- rity-Report_digital.pdf Peter Jones is a Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. Philippe Lagassé is an Associate Professor in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

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