Vanguard Magazine

A Case For Accelerated Canadian Submarine Procurement B Y N O R M A N J O L I N GROUP UP! 12 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2024 www.vanguardcanada.com P R O C U R E M E N T T o anyone who been following defence related media of late, it will come as no surprise to hear that Canada has an aging submarine fleet that is rapidly approaching the end of its service life. For those unfamiliar with the situation, the current fleet of four Victoria-class submarines were originally in service with the British Royal Navy, which decided to concentrate on a nuclear-powered submarine fleet in the 1990s, thereby causing their four conventionally powered patrol submarines to be prematurely retired from service. These submarines were subsequently acquired by Canada in 1998, as a submarine capability life extension project, because the then in-service Canadian Oberon-class patrol submarines were at the end of their service lives. While the 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged, committed to maintaining a submarine capability by modernizing the Victoria-class, it stopped short of announcing a replacement for these submarines, which are now all over 30 years old. BRITISH NAME Upholder Unseen Ursula Unicorn LAID DOWN Nov 1983 Aug 1987 Aug 1987 Mar 1989 LAUNCHED Dec 1986 Nov 1989 Feb 1991 Apr1992 COMMISSIONED Dec 1986 Nov 1989 Feb 1991 Apr 1992 BRITISH SERVICE Jun 1990 - Apr 1994 Jul 1991 - Apr 1994 May 1992 - Jun 1994 Jun 1993 - Oct 1994 CANADIAN NAME Chicoutimi Victoria Corner Brook Windsor CHICOUTIMI VICTORIA CORNER BROOK WINDSOR Twenty-six years later, on April 8, 2024, the Government of Canada released its long-anticipated defence policy update en- titled "Our North, Strong and Free: A Re- newed Vision for Canada's Defence." The defence policy update states to: "explore options for renewing and expanding our submarine fleet to enable the Royal Cana- dian Navy to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines." 1 Notably, in addition to renewal, the policy implies fleet expansion; specifically more than a one for one replacement of the four Victoria-class, of which at least eight sub- marines are considered to be necessary to maintain simultaneous availability on both coasts. Where these vessels will come from is an important question, particularly since international submarine building capacity is approaching its limits. This is because a large number of nations are undergoing submarine build programmes, including some that are investing in a submarine capability for the first time. Canada's situ- ation is further complicated by a lack of a domestic submarine building capability and the fact that it lacks both the time and resources to build the necessary infrastruc- ture, as all four Victoria-class will have to be retired by the end of the next decade. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that a replacement submarine will have to be built offshore. At the same time, the costs to maintain

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