Vanguard Magazine

P R O J E C T M A N A G E M E N T www.vanguardcanada.com FEBRUARY/MARCH 2025 21 and what may occur going forward in the weapons platform to be acquired in terms of operational profiles (e.g. time on contingency operations in distant theatres of conflict), 'infant mortality' and through-life major system failures (e.g. replacement of major electrical gen- erators driving electric propulsion), and sensors and weapons that are rendered ineffective by new technologies (e.g. drones) as well as the impacts of quan- tum leaps in general technologies (e.g. AI driving many more combat system software upgrades); and • the method of converging on a LCCE when multiple approaches are em- ployed, which provide differing esti- mates, whether by simple averaging or by weighting the approaches based on the levels of uncertainty of each. Also important are the available analyses supporting estimate credibility mentioned above and missing from the PBO report in question – confidence ranges based on sensitivity analysis for the major cost driv- ing parameters, and the aggregate level of the estimate's uncertainty based on the probability and costs of known risks mate- rializing (e.g. a major fire while operating the platform) and the uncertainty of as- signed costs where they are based on judg- ment and assumptions (e.g. the consumer price index out 30 years). One other factor stood out after litera- ture survey of papers available on the In- ternet. There appeared to be no verifica- tion case studies indicating the accuracy of an initial LCCE when compared to actual costs over the life of the subject artifact. A naysayer would liken this to throwing a dart but never watching to see where it lands on the dartboard. One therefore is left with many ques- tions regarding the LCCE in the PBO's report on the River Class destroyers. Not only is unclear how the generated single- point estimate will be employed, but the lack of detailed documentation in sup- porting annexes prevents one from un- derstanding the estimate's accuracy and credibility. I am sure that the PBO has this information, and I may have missed some appendices beyond Appendix A; perhaps the PBO could enlighten the public. In the meantime, one should therefore be careful about reaching conclusions based on such life cycle cost estimates. One should not conclude that they are another 'tor- pedo' of the intended acquisition project, proof that the project is 'out of control', or that such estimates warrant a reduction in the number of platforms to be acquired. Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ian Mack served for a decade (2007-2017) in the Department of National Defence, with responsibilities related to the National Shipbuilding Strategy, three shipbuilding projects and four vehicle projects. Ian is a Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management, the World Commercial and Contracting Association and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. bestdefenceconference.com London, Ontario - 300 York Steet SAVE THE DATE OCTOBER 21-22, 2025

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