Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/1540397
14 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2025 www.vanguardcanada.com F E AT U R E B Y N O R M A N J O L I N CONSIDERATIONS IN TRAINING AND CREWING A FUTURE CANADIAN SUBMARINE TIME FOR AN 'ALL ROUND C anada is about to embark on a replacement for the four Victo- ria-class submarines currently in service with the Royal Ca- nadian Navy (RCN). The proj- ect, entitled the Canadian Patrol Subma- rine Project (CPSP), is the manifestation of a multi-decade requirement to replace the three British Oberon-class submarines acquired in the 1960s.The interim 1998 decision to purchase four used British conventional submarines, called the Vic- toria-class in RCN service, was always en- visioned as a temporary solution to main- tain a submarine capability by generating a cadre of submariners while a replacement project was pursued. 1 Little did anyone think that it would take over a quarter of a century for a submarine replacement project to be realized. With the RCN now actively seeking a new, non-British, class of submarine, it is worth understanding that Canada has not really had to consider base- line submarine crew composition, and its related training and support issues, beyond the day-to-day personnel issues that are the hallmark of small units. as the total numbers are small compared to other CAF units. The significant differ- ence is that in a warship, and particularly in a submarine, the crews are small, while simultaneously representing a number of diverse occupations, at different rank, skill and certification levels all of which must be in place prior to sailing. The naval personnel situation is further exacerbated by the need to support ships and subma- rines from two coastal bases approximately 6,000 km apart. A polite way of saying the present CAF "one size fits all" personnel system has never worked for the navy and continues to frustrate the conduct of na- val operations. The long-standing issues surrounding naval personnel and training will only be resolved with a return to pre- Unification RCN control of the entire en- terprise. But what of submarines and the Cana- dian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP)? At the time of writing, Canada has issued a request for information (RFI) to industry, indicating the submarines will be built off- shore. Furthermore, on 26 August 2025 the Government of Canada identified Anyone who has ever had to deal with naval personnel issues in Canada under- stands it has always been challenging, es- pecially after the Unification of the Cana- dian Armed Forces (CAF) in the 1960s. 2 The current military personnel and train- ing model is driven by baseline numbers authorized in each CAF unit's personnel establishment, which allocates personnel, by rank and occupation, that is used to determine recruitment requirements. 3 The rationale behind the model is that autho- rized personnel levels are tied directly to positions and it assumes there to be no re- quirement to exceed these numbers. What the rationale does not account for is CAF training policies that eschew the realities of naval operations, which can have person- nel temporarily away on training for up to six months without replacement, the need for onboard training to meet at sea qualifi- cation/certification requirements and the daily short-fused medical and compassion- ate issues that precede any deployment. To the pan-CAF perspective of person- nel issues, the gravity of this situation is often misunderstood and under resourced

