Vanguard Magazine

34 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2025 www.vanguardcanada.com T H E LA S T W O R D party can possibly mitigate them – the industry premium to take such respon- sibilities being a significant 'sunk cost', whether such risks emerge or not. • Relationships across the contract divide that should be built on collaboration and trust are frowned upon, if not prohibited. The risk of perceived impropriety (rooted in a lack of trust and aversion to risk) is simply too worrying. Boundary walls are established as a matter of cultural safety, and a defensive 'we-them' posture is the immediate response to arising issues. • Even though transparency is vital to de- mocracy, it is sidestepped in risky initia- tives to avoid acknowledging obstacles to policy execution. This further erodes the understanding and trust that builds credibility, and allows the resulting vac- uum to be filled with guesstimates and complaints at best and venomous attacks and wild assumptions of incompetence at worst. This risk aversion is short-sighted because contracts outlast the procurement process. The carte blanche transfer of risks to indus- try during acquisition can create soured relations with the supply chain, leading to post-commissioning inflated prices for spares and overhaul maintenance, a lethar- gic response to arising technical issues and a hawkish protection of dated intellectual property. As well, such risk aversion during weap- ons systems platform acquisitions stands in stark contrast to the reality of those in uni- form who risk having to pay the ultimate price – their very lives, and the health and future welfare of their families indirectly – to protect this nation and others in mul- tilateral security arrangements like NATO. Defence industry officials, CAF users of these weapons systems platforms and astute external observers all know this. Everyone is aware that the government's treatment of the related risks needs to be a focal point in reforming defence procurement. To be blunt, this is why I am so pas- sionate about dealing with risk aversion and employing advanced risk treatment techniques for complex military platform acquisitions. Below, I have paraphrased some of the salient points in a much more fulsome pa- per published on the Policy Insights Fo- rum (Treating Risks in Complex Projects, 12 February 2025): • There have been many successful pro- grams to incrementally treat the addic- tion to organizational risk aversion, and such initiatives are essential to the future culture of a yet-to-be-established De- fence Procurement Agency in particu- lar, and the federal government at large when dealing with weapons systems plat- form acquisitions. • Embracing risk—rather than transferring it, concealing it, or assuming it can be eliminated through mitigation—is essen- tial to preventing the serious harm now seen in complex weapons systems projects and the CAF capabilities they support. • Full transparency with all stakeholders— including taxpayers—about the com- plexity of acquisitions, the unavoidable risks (and mistakes), their impacts, and the remedial actions taken can prevent the greater damage of cover-ups. Such openness builds credibility and demon- strates the accountability essential to a strong democracy. • Bodies that govern such complex ac- quisitions must be fully educated and involved in risk treatment, to the point where their meeting agendas are largely set around acquisition project risks. • Risk treatment using the government's risk registers and heat maps must be re- stricted to the early stages of planning. • Every complex procurement project needs a 'Risk Rapid Response Team' to deal with the emergence of all unexpect- ed risks and the development of an ap- propriate response strategy and plan for those that are of significant concern to the project's outcomes. • Risk treatment must be a collabora- tive enterprise-wide activity, enabling the weak signals of emerging risks to be sensed by anyone and reported expedi- tiously to the joint Project Control Of- fice. • Instead of relying on mitigation, the Scouting motto "Be Prepared" (for the worst) should be the strategy employed by developing damage control courses of action to deal with varying degrees of both residual and fully realized risks. Many who read this note will suggest that I am naïve. They will argue that such transparency will damage credibility, not reinforce it. Many will say that you can- not trust the defence industry. Some ob- servers have suggested that the excessive bureaucratic processes can be addressed without changing the risk aversion reality, along with many other necessary reforms. And they are entitled to their own opin- ions. Returning to the CPSP, the Royal Ca- nadian Navy cannot see a timely replace- ment to their troubled Upholder class without avoiding programmatic risk aver- sion and employing much more advanced risk treatment then risk registers and heat maps. The outcome must be perfect and on time, for the business of submariners is one of the riskiest disciplines in the de- fence business. Perhaps the imminent CP- SP-focused conference could build upon the somewhat risky selection of just two suppliers to compete to deliver subma- rines, by exploring the most efficient ap- proach to get to an initial contract award. Democracies may be deeply risk- averse—or highly effective at managing risk through transparency and account- ability. As we have seen with the Cana- dian approach, the former behaviour can be extremely harmful to progressing complex projects and to the credibility of the government executing them. Surely, it is time to embrace the related risks by employing a more effective approach to navigating unavoidable risks. Rear-Admiral (Retd) Ian Mack served for a decade (2007-2017) in the Department of National Defence, with responsibili- ties related to the National Shipbuilding Strategy, three shipbuilding projects and four vehicle projects. Ian is a Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management, the World Commercial and Contracting Association and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Photo: DND

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