Vanguard Magazine

F E AT U R E www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2025 15 LOOK' Hanwha Ocean of South Korea and Thys- sen Krupp Marine Systems of Germany as the two qualified suppliers for the CPSP. 4 Both represent different language, cultural and operating routines than the legacy submarines familiar to Canada. When Can- ada made the decision to acquire the Brit- ish Oberon-class submarines in the 1960s the RCN had over 200 officers and men then serving in British submarines. 5 No- tably, in addition to language and cultural similarities, the crew composition reflect- ed the same occupations (classification/ trades) of the RCN surface fleet. All that was required was submarine-specific train- ing. But the next class of submarine will necessarily be different, which will com- pel an immediate review of personnel and training requirements once the country- of-origin (COO) is selected. The most immediate requirement fac- ing the RCN will be to ascertain whether the current naval occupation structure will work for the selected class of submarine, for both operations and maintenance. This will necessarily involve a thorough under- standing of the culture that determined their operations and maintenance routines. From there Canada will need to rapidly de- termine what occupation changes are nec- essary to build the personnel establishment that will crew the submarine for a lengthy deployment, whilst simultaneously sup- porting it from ashore - notably the Fleet Maintenance Facilities (FMF). Should it be determined that changes to the legacy military occupation structures (MOS) are required, any changes will have to be made early to allow for the requisite training essential for initial acceptance of the sub- marines. Again, this underscores the need for a rapid naval analysis and not a lengthy CAF-style MOS review. Once the baseline personnel establish- ment is developed, plans for COO initial cadre training, and eventual training pa- triation to Canada, will soon be required. Training length will vary dependent on oc- cupation, position in the establishment and unique certification requirements. This is an area where history has repeatedly shown that under resourcing personnel numbers to meet CAF policy guidelines negatively impacts both the transition to the new fleet and the ability to operate (and maintain) the legacy fleet during the transition pe- riod. The CAF 1960s-era "one man, one job" baseline for personnel strength sim- ply does not work, particularly for small diverse crews. Experience has shown the need to 'over establish' the personnel and associated training numbers, to what may seem to be significantly 'in excess of the re- quirement', as the numbers represent many diverse qualifications and backgrounds. 6 Failure to get ahead of the requirements for trained personnel will impact the quick transition to a new submarine fleet but also foment dissatisfaction impacting both re- cruitment and retention in the submarine service during the lengthy transition pe- riod to steady state training. We have seen this before – and the subsequent damaging impact it has on recruiting for submarine crews within the RCN. The good news is that Canada has indicated its intention to replace the four Victoria-class submarines with up to 12 conventionally powered pa- trol submariness. However, a submarine fleet of this size will necessarily bring into place a number of changes to the legacy RCN fleet composition and therefore na- val personnel policies. First and foremost, 12 submarines, regardless of their small crew size, will cease to be a niche element of the RCN, but rather represent a signifi- cant strategic part of a balanced fleet. The RCN will no longer be defined as a solely a frigate/destroyer navy that drives, current- ly, all naval personnel and training policy and resources. Moreover, 12 submarines The good news is that Canada has indicated its intention to replace the four Victoria-class submarines with up to 12 conventionally powered patrol submarines - numbers which, for the first time, allow for a meaningful submarine capability to be able to patrol off all three coasts. HMCS Windsor. Photo: DND

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