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Success will be dependent upon the trained personnel resources available throughout the process. To achieve this, whilst simultaneously introducing the River-class destroyers, the RCN must exercise control over all the levers of the personnel and training process, to ensure there is the requisite number of people resources needed to build a cadre of submarine expertise. F E AT U R E 16 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2025 www.vanguardcanada.com – in a potential a six and six split between east and west coast bases – will allow for the creation of a critical personnel mass of submarine crews and maintenance staffs to allow for an unrestricted operations tempo and surge capability in times of tension. 7 Assuming a delivery schedule of the first submarine by 2035 with further sub- marines following at an agreed transfer drumbeat, decisions regarding training, including the supporting infrastructure, will require a high level of RCN interac- tion with the Materiel Group. 8 This would be a challenge at the best of times, how- ever, with an anticipated mid-decade de- livery of the first of a fleet of submarines, the CPSP will be in direct competition with the simultaneous introduction of the River-class destroyers. This has the poten- tial to be an immensely disruptive factor that will require careful coordination by the RCN. While the project, under the Materiel Group, will be responsible for all CPSP deliverables, which include training as part of Integrated Logistics Support, it is the RCN, through the Chief of Military Personnel, that must ensure the requisite numbers of personnel are selected and available in time for this training. To work, this will require significant planning, as well as potential reassessment of longstanding CAF personnel policies. Specifically, the issue of retention policies and incentives for CPSP trained personnel, as the RCN will soon be in competition with industry for submarine trained personnel that have completed the initial cadre training. 9 Unlike the Oberon experience of the 1960s, both CPSP countries of origin rep- resent significant cultural and language differences to Canadians. Therefore, every effort should be made to put the requisite infrastructure in place, in Canada, as soon as practicable, where training in the new submarine can be conducted domestically. To support this training, the required in- frastructure to support submarines in Hal- ifax and Esquimalt will demand a certain amount of duplication of training resourc- es. While one coast may be designated a submarine centre of excellence for baseline submarine training and tactical develop- ment, there needs to be adequate training facilities, notably simulators, available on the other coast. 10 This is where synergies with other major naval projects, notably the River-class destroyers, are useful. No longer a sub-set of the surface fleet, a large Canadian submarine fleet will fully justify the construction of land-based test facili- ties that can offer a combined training and tactical development opportunities. Cana- da will need to swiftly determine which is the lead coast to commence building the supporting infrastructure, as it must be in place and operating before the first subma- rine arrives. In summary, the Canadian Patrol Sub- marine Project has personnel implications of a scale and detail that have not been looked at since the 1980s. Canada will be procuring a completely different subma- rine that will be operated by smaller crews and supported by an infrastructure com- prising both military and civilian expertise underpinned by an international supply chain. Success will be dependent upon the trained personnel resources available throughout the process. To achieve this, whilst simultaneously introducing the Riv- er-class destroyers, the RCN must exercise control over all the levers of the person- nel and training process, to ensure there is the requisite number of people resources needed to build a cadre of submarine ex- pertise. The 2030s are indeed shaping up to be a very busy time for the Royal Canadian Navy and submarines. References: 1. "The submarine we own today was a used submarine that was designed to do one thing for us, and that was pre- serve our ability to generate submari- ners and maintain the knowledge and skills required to successfully operate a submarine force." Commander RCN, VAdm Angus Topshee quoted in CDR Volume 31, Issue 4, August 2025, pg 19. 2. The Canadian Forces Re-Organi- zation Act (known as Unification) Master Sailor Anna Whiten in her workspace onboard HMCS Chicoutimi, in CFB Esquimalt, B.C. Photo: DND

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