Vanguard Magazine

30 DECEMBER 2025/JANUARY 2026 www.vanguardcanada.com T H E LA S T W O R D retirement plan to facilitate downsizing the public service, which could also address those who refuse to get on board, replacing them with more aligned and capable leaders from outside the government. The first of these two needs to be com- pleted ASAP, preferably within 12 months. It could involve sector-specific tiger teams of experienced and open-minded prac- titioners, both serving and retired. They could be tasked to reduce regulations to minimal 'thou shall' statements, support- ed by listed 'considerations' for selection based on context. This new rulebook would inform process re-engineering, which in my view is best conducted by a reputable external pro- vider. The end product should tag every required process as follows: • The process step's objective (the 'what') must be clear. • A responsibility and accountability frame- work for each process step must define the 'who" by employing RACI diagrams (or equivalent). These identify who is re- sponsible for what, who is accountable overall, who is to be consulted and who is to be informed. • Progress within the process map – the 'how" – should privilege collective and concurrent 'swarming' followed by paral- lel processing, only defaulting to sequen- tial activities if unavoidable. • The governance approval authority must also be identified, along with the dele- gated authorities to the execution teams. And two linked cautions are offered for senior governance: o The Committee cannot be effective if all projects over $100 million are ad- dressed by its members, because they will have insufficient time to explore issues, manage risks and provide appro- priate decisions. o Members should be largely unencum- bered by other priority demands to en- able timely decisions. The second of these strategies regarding DIA personnel requires a deft hand. Early retirement decisions by self-selecting vol- unteers will mean that a lot of valuable 'lived experience' will be lost to the DIA. Tracking contact information for retired alumni members is important for potential part-time employment. As well, such losses could significantly reduce those expected to transfer into the DIA, necessitating one of two actions: temporary replacements on short-term contracts, or persuading other officials to leave their home departments to join the DIA with promotions or sign-on bonus incentives. However, overuse of the second option could potentially sour rela- tionships with the in-service contingents remaining in DND, PSPC and ISEDC. The importing of intermediate leaders via Interchange Canada can be as disrup- tive as useful. Therefore, the CEO could immediately pursue available 'good fit' leaders from outside the government who have the skills required and interest in a minimum three-year commitment with generous incentives. A caution about moving faster At a Canadian Club lunch in Toronto in early November, the Prime Minister is re- ported as saying "…the risk is not to take risk", a quote often employed in the busi- ness community. Those who've worked in operations un- derstand that efficiency, over-emphasized, can do real damage to long-term out- comes. Early results can soon turn into abject failure once they're in-service for a few years. This is especially true with weap- ons systems that must remain reliable and affordable in-service for decades – CAF members' lives are literally at stake. Hence, taking such risks requires guardrails. When customers and/or politics delay the launch of platform projects for years, the only possible DIA option to enable timely CAF capability is leasing military- off-the-shelf systems. But these come with risks in terms of financial liability to the government and harm to CAF members if the gear is just 'adequate'. Reframing the Prime Minister's comments The risk facing the DIA is not simply a reluctance to take risks. It is the absence of the broad business acumen and compe- tencies required to shape programs before contracts are awarded, ensuring industry can manage the shared, baked-in risks that determine whether the right weap- ons systems are delivered at the right time. Sharing such risks is a delicate matter, and changing this paradigm of 'no risk to Can- ada' as dictated by lawyers is a challenge to be overcome. As mentioned by Sabia, this is about taking 'some' risks Setting the client's requirements takes whatever time it takes, and I assume that is outside the DIA's scope. And as I have observed in the past, when not done right by the CAF, chaos ensues. As frequently opined by one of my bosses, complex platform procurement projects slip one day at a time. As risks emerge, sustained urgency from everyone involved in govern- ment is the antidote to project failure in terms of schedule (and its sibling, cost) and the CAF. To facilitate urgency, leaders must act like bulldozers by removing risks to the execution team's timely progress. And as implied in the book How Big Things Get Done, the DIA should never pressure the prime contractor of a com- plex acquisition project to rush the plan- ning, which invites otherwise avoidable risks that slow down or destroy projects during construction, integration and com- missioning. Interestingly, Australia has just announced the creation of a Defence Delivery Agency (DDA) by merging three existing groups, along with a plan to complete the transition within 18 months. A recent article in ASPI's The Strategist offers both reinforcement of some of the above as well as some other critical aspects worthy of consideration as the DIA is stood up. The DDA is intended to make "…fundamental change to how capability is conceptualized, developed and acquired, deployed into operational service and then sustained and ultimately modern- ized as a continual and constant process", with a focus on speed of delivery. Granted, the new agency's mandate is broader than platform acquisition, but it is worth pursu- ing by the DIA. At its best, the DIA can be the catalyst that accelerates Canada's weapons-system acquisition enterprise toward consistently delivering effective platforms on time. At its worst, we can hope that it will ignite a slow evolution to improved timeliness through incremental evolutionary steps. To be blunt and with so much funding earmarked for the CAF's future capabilities, the risk of the DIA failing is unthinkable. Rear-Admiral (Retd) Ian Mack served for a decade (2007-2017) in the Department of National Defence, with responsibilities re- lated to the National Shipbuilding Strategy, three shipbuilding projects and four vehicle projects. Ian is a Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management, the World Commercial and Contracting As- sociation and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

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