Vanguard Magazine

20 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2026 www.vanguardcanada.com F E AT U R E The relationship between economics and security has always existed but is now explicit. The global economy has become an arena of coercion rather than coopera- tion. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act restricts semiconductor exports to China and Beijing retaliates with bans on criti- cal mineral exports essential to Western industries. Russia uses energy supply as leverage over Europe, while the United States itself increasingly employs financial instruments as tools of strategic denial. For Canada, a nation built on resource wealth and export trade, this merging of economics and security poses unique chal- lenges. The country's prosperity depends on open sea lanes and reliable access to markets. Its defence, however, depends on alliance credibility and the ability to secure North America's approaches. When these spheres merge, as they now have, Canada must think holistically. The absence of a coherent economic- security framework leaves the country vul- nerable to both coercion and neglect. Al- lies expect contributions that demonstrate seriousness of purpose and adversaries ex- ploit indecision. Without clear priorities, Canada risks being treated not as a partner but as a passenger. Historical analogies are imperfect but instructive. After 1815, Britain emerged as the world's dominant power. Its navy guaranteed freedom of the seas; its indus- tries fueled global trade. The period of Pax Britannica was one of immense prosperity, but also of complacency. By the late 19th century, Germany and the United States had surpassed Britain industrially, while France and Russia refused to accept per- manent subordination. The system that seemed eternal unraveled within decades, ending in global war. The United States followed a similar trajectory after 1991. Victorious in the Cold War, it presided over an unprec- edented expansion of global liberal order. Yet structural factors such as debt, dein- dustrialization, and political polarization eroded its ability to sustain hegemony. To- day, America remains powerful but over- stretched, its leadership contested and its credibility tested. For middle powers like Canada, these transitions are perilous. The decline of a hegemon creates space for competition and demands strategic self-reliance. As the guarantor of order falters, states must define their interests anew. Canada's con- tinued assumption of benign continuity is therefore the most dangerous illusion of all. Canada's geography ensures that its fate is bound to the United States, but not identical to it. The two nations share de- fense obligations through NORAD and NATO, yet their threat perceptions di- verge. For Washington, Canada is a secu- rity partner; for Ottawa, the United States is simultaneously protector and potential source of strategic dependency. The real danger is not invasion but mar- ginalization. If the United States loses con- fidence in Canada's capacity to defend its northern and maritime approaches, it will act unilaterally. That would amount to a loss of sovereignty by default, the quiet erosion of control over one's own territory. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is cen- tral to preventing this outcome. A credible maritime capability demonstrates commit- ment to collective defense and asserts sov- ereignty in Canada's vast maritime estate. It also enables meaningful participation in global operations that uphold the prin- ciples from which Canada's prosperity de- rives: freedom of navigation, secure trade routes, and deterrence of coercion at sea. The ends of naval strategy flow directly from national interests. Canada must deny adversaries the ability to operate within its maritime approaches; enforce sovereignty against non-military incursions such as il- legal fishing, smuggling, and environmen- tal violations; and contribute to the main- tenance of international order through alliance operations. These are not theoreti- cal goals; they are the practical expression of sovereignty and credibility. The means to achieve them are limited but potent. Anti-submarine warfare re- mains essential as Russia and China expand undersea capabilities. Persistent surveil- lance and domain awareness are indispens- able for both defence and constabulary enforcement. Partnership with the Coast Guard and other federal agencies must evolve toward seamless integration. Beyond defence, maritime power sup- ports diplomacy. Naval presence signals commitment, deters aggression, and reas- sures allies. Even small deployments carry disproportionate political weight. The Navy's ability to operate globally through task groups, humanitarian missions and freedom-of-navigation patrols constitutes one of Canada's most visible contributions to international security. Developing such a naval strategy would be an important step, but it cannot substi- tute for grand strategy. The deeper prob- lem is cultural. Canada lacks a tradition of strategic debate. The public discourse on defence is episodic and reactive, focused on procurement controversies or specific missions but rarely on the relationship be- tween power and purpose. A strategic culture is not simply aware- ness of military matters. It is the collective HMCS Charlottetown sails in the Eastern Mediterranean during Operation REASSURANCE. Photo: DND As a maritime trading nation dependent on global commerce and continental defense, its prosperity and sovereignty are inseparable from the sea. The logic of grand strategy is therefore inherently maritime.

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