Vanguard Magazine

A Wartime Footing Calls for www.vanguardcanada.com FEBRUARY/MARCH 2026 29 T H E LA S T W O R D Naval Shipbuilding Strategy 2.0 I n August 2008 when I was given the task of developing what would soon become the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS), we were reacting to procurement chal- lenges with the Joint Support Ship (JSS) acquisition project. The NSPS—now rebranded as the Na- tional Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS)—was driven by the need to replace multiple Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) vessels be- yond the Joint Support Ships, including the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels and the Canadian Patrol Frigates. As well, the Ca- nadian Coast Guard had a significant num- ber of scientific and icebreaking vessels that were required but had experienced pro- curement challenges with its HERO class. It was clear to the PMO and PCO that we needed a better way to acquire the govern- ment's large and complex ships. Since the signing of NSS umbrella agree- ments signaled the NSS's launch in earnest in February 2012, the initial two shipyards have been on steep modernization and learning curves in a progressively less peace- ful environment. With the recent addition of the third NSS shipyard, all three have full order books with no apparent additional ca- pacity for a decade or more. Concurrently, the geopolitical stability of 2008 has dramatically deteriorated. Instead of the five-day Russian invasion and war in Georgia that we saw in August 2008, we are approaching the fourth anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. As reported in Semafor on December 18, 2025, Rus- sian president Putin again pledged to liber- ate Russia's historic lands, adding that "the European swine backing Ukraine would eventually give up." The RCN has been moving to expand its fleet as quickly as possible with new subma- rines and ongoing considerations for a con- tinental defence corvette class. But with the three NSS shipyards booked to deliver other necessary government vessels, Canada will likely have to go offshore — as is intended for 12 new submarines — or employ other existing shipyards in Canada. Essentially, our nation appears to be coming to grips with the need to move to a wartime footing and with an increased pri- ority in the Arctic. In terms of the RCN, this is best addressed by NSS 2.0 as a pro- gram for additional new capabilities. It is already preparing for a significant enhance- ment of support capabilities as it contem- plates the future fleet of submarines. This short note raises some of the ques- tions that a NSS 2.0 program should con- sider in terms of the top-of-mind options and related issues to enable the RCN to achieve a wartime footing. This article does not address the equally essential sup- ply chain issues such as super-security and extensive warehousing of stockpiled mu- nitions and spare parts — sovereignty on steroids. Strengths and weaknesses The good news is that we are not start- ing with a blank sheet of paper in terms of strengths: • We are more than a decade into the jour- ney of recreating Canada's shipbuilding capabilities and cooperative relationships, as well as reinforcing the marine systems and services clusters that support con- struction activity. These shipyards could also leverage ship design companies to start developing concept design options for future ship aspirations. • We have a strong set of defence indus- tries in Canada with respect to sensors and combat management systems. • There are many other, less capable ship- yards in Canada whose current condition and potential for growth would likely re- quire assessment. • A Defence Investment Agency (DIA) is being created to improve procure- ment practices while tackling military platform acquisition projects, with the behemoths being warships. In support is a complementary defence industrial strategy that may have been announced as one reads this note. • The minister of national defence has publicly stated that there is interest from many nations to collaborate with Canada. Of course, there are also some less robust maritime elements: • Challenges remain with the timely de- livery of River Class destroyers and ice- breakers for the Coast Guard. • While we appear to have the shipbuild- ing workforce to get the NSS order books delivered in the coming years, there doesn't seem to be a large pipe- line of skilled personnel behind them. The smaller shipyards may also remain short of competent blue-collar builders. Resolving the personnel challenges of ramping up other shipyards is presently an unknown. • Nor is the government's workforce able to easily take on new studies, assess non- NSS shipyards and other suppliers' capa- bilities, and initiate more shipbuilding projects. This situation is further exacer- bated by a degree of turbulence as the DIA finds its footing and the govern- ment downsizes. • While reliance in the past on U.S. ship- building expertise was useful, it might no longer be expected with confidence. • Based on the speed of technological ad- vancements, the original two NSS ship- yards may need immediate and ongoing investment in facilities and equipment; it has already been almost 15 years since they identified the equipment needed to bid on shipyard modernization under NSPS. Facility expansion (on the same site or nearby) may also be worth con- sidering. B Y I A N M A C K CCGS Pierre Radisson. Photo: DND

• Cover