Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/1545837
20 JUNE/JULY 2026 www.vanguardcanada.com storage facilities and critical transportation routes, as demonstrated by Iran in the Middle East. In the Canadian context, that would include infrastructure like ports, nuclear power plants, oil refineries and other structures along our coasts and the St. Lawrence Seaway. With the CAL established, it then be- comes a question of priority and alloca- tion in terms of both active air and mis- sile defence, layered and diverse effectors to target incoming threats, and passive air and missile defence, camouflage and con- cealment, hardening, redundancy, with an intent to strike the right balance between infinite risk at one extreme and infinite cost at the other. Not everything in a na- tion as large and diverse as Canada can be actively defended, which means it is about choices. Making those choices in terms of identifying the most critical and at-risk as- sets allows for the creation of a Defended Asset List (DAL), which is a subset of the CAL, and facilitates a determination as to how best to defend them. Canada's current IAMD capabilities con- sist of limited ground-based sensors and armed fighter aircraft augmented by US and NORAD sensors. Whether it be UAS, low-observable cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles or ballistic missiles, not even ad- vanced sensors that provide full domain awareness from seabed to space will per- mit Canada to deny or defeat the scale and complexity of an attack like those being seen today in both Ukraine and the Middle East with our current capabilities. Without being able to deny or defeat, there is no de- terrence. Achieving that deterrence will re- quire a layered and multi-domain approach that includes air, land and sea-borne weap- ons based in Canada. Equally as important, the ability to leverage advanced sensors and platforms being delivered will require the design and fielding of a robust digital archi- tecture that supports data movement and data fusion integrated with a command and control network that ensures that threats are seen and acted upon in increasingly re- duced timelines and that any weapon used is the one best suited for the threat. As evi- denced in the Middle East today, the use of a $3M missile against a $60K drone puts the defender on the wrong side of the cost curve and gives the attacker the advantage in the long run. That suggests that the full spectrum of systems must be introduced to the Canadian inventory and those systems would best enhance Canada's defensive capabilities if they are considered within both the domestic and deployed context. The IAMD required to protect the Cana- dian-led battle group in Latvia needs to be capable of doing the same things while in- tegrating within the NORAD IAMD. The problem being solved is the same, the solu- tions applied should also be similar. The Way Ahead The complexity and 360-degree nature of the threat necessitate a continued and deep relationship with the United States and NORAD on IAMD. Whatever Canada leverages to improve IAMD in Canada, and its contribution to continental secu- rity, is equally as applicable to its efforts within NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. The IAMD threat in all theatres is varied and complex and solving it will require an integrated solution across multiple do- mains and nations. Canada's investment in IAMD will make Canada safer while bet- ter contributing to collective security and is essential to being able to deter, detect, deny and defeat any potential adversary. Terry Leversedge is a retired senior RCAF officer, published author and amateur his- torian. His career in military aerospace en- gineering encompassed a wide number of positions at both field units and within the headquarters of the RCAF, before he re- tired as a Brigadier General aer 35 years of service. Figure 1: Integrated Air & Missile Defence System in Canada This diagram illustrates the complexity of creating an Integrated Air & Missile Defence System in Canada. Some of the elements needed are seen superimposed over the existing NORAD sensor suite. - (original diagram courtesy of the Canadian Forces)

