Vanguard Magazine

22 JUNE/JULY 2026 www.vanguardcanada.com A E W & C Russian Federation. Threats would have limited intrusion routes due to technical limitations, and be forced to use predict- able routes in predictable ways. In that context, fixed, ground-based radar networks provided the most effi- cient solution. Persistent coverage mat- tered more than flexibility, and it could be achieved far more cheaply from the ground than from the air. AEW&C was useful, but not essential for Canada, es- pecially given its limited focus on expedi- tionary operations. The United States, by contrast, invested heavily in AEW&C because it needed the capability abroad. Airborne early warn- ing allowed it to project power with situ- ational awareness wherever it deployed. This strategic environment is now changing. Long-range cruise missiles, more capable adversary air forces, and the potential for complex, multi-axis attacks strain systems built around fixed sensors and predictable warning timelines. Emerg- ing tactics such as drones launched from within national borders—see Ukraine's operation Spiderweb against Russian air- bases—mean that detection tools can't ex- ist only at frontiers. This is particularly true around high-profile targets. At least one mobile radar site was set up in Canada to provide better security during the World Cup and American AEW&C aircraft are almost certainly part of contingency plans. AEW&C aircraft can also "fill in" when a fixed radar site is down for maintenance, or add an unpredictable node to an ar- ea's radar coverage—an adversary with knowledge of our systems will be confi- dent where they can and cannot operate without detection by fixed sites, while just the possibility that an AEW&C air- craft may unexpectedly show up in an area is something that might deter cer- tain forms of intrusion. With the United States both shrinking its own AEW&C fleet, and signalling a draft away from close cooperation with Canada—they have placed at least two long-standing cooperation forums, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Army Reserve General Officers Advi- sory Board, on hiatus so far in 2026—it makes sense for Canada to fill this gap with an independent capability. The United States is not filling a gap— it is attempting to evolve an already ma- ture capability. For decades, American airpower has relied on large AEW&C fleets, including the Air Force's E-3 Sentry and the Navy's E-2 Hawkeye. These platforms remain effective, and their successors are highly capable. The shift away from them is not driven by dissatisfaction—except perhaps by the sense that they're increasingly vulnerable—but by the appeal of what space-based systems might offer. In theory, satellites could provide per- sistent, global coverage without the con- straints of aircraft. They do not require refuelling, are less exposed to immediate threats, and can operate continuously. Their data can be fed to ground-based analysts who can be rotated without af- fecting the platform. A sufficiently large constellation could create an "always-on" surveillance net- work—something no fleet of aircraft can match. This vision is driving U.S. invest- ment. The challenge for other countries is that the physics and operational realities of space impose constraints that must be overcome. And the solutions to those constraints require enormous scale. E-2C Hawkeye flies over Jacksonville, Florida Photo: U.S. Navy,by Lt. j.g. John A. Ivancic

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