Vanguard Magazine

Feb/Mar 2014

Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR

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Beyond its "best before" date D DEFENCE CaNada First deFeNCe strategy 16 FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014 www.vanguardcanada.com George macdonald retired as Vice Chief of the Defence Staff in 2004 and has since worked as a consultant on defence and security issues. He is a board member of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute and a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. t he Conservative government's current defence poli- cy, the Canada First Defence Strategy, was issued in May 2008. The document was hastily written after a general clamour for one when the government simply announced their intentions regarding defence issues without any documentation. Notwithstanding this beginning, throughout the almost six years since its release the CFDS has been of fundamen- tal importance to the Department of National Defence in estab- lishing resources and priorities for the capabilities needed to fulfil the government-mandated missions. Importantly, the CFDS has provided the guidance for devel- opment of an investment plan to implement the policy. The in- vestment plan is a critical force development document in that it charts out expenditures for military capabilities, ensuring that they are scheduled at the appropriate time, are balanced and prior- itized according to the greatest need. Needless to say, the demand for resources and funding invariably exceeds the supply so the process to establish priorities and scheduling of available money is rigorous and managed very carefully. It should come as no surprise that times have changed since the current CFDS was released. The global recession which hit later in 2008 eventually resulted in a significant deficit in federal spend- ing for economic stimulus initiatives. The DND budget did not escape the cuts to departmental allocations which fol- lowed. Indeed, the military has seen outright reduc- tions from strategic review and deficit reduction initia- tives, lack of funding for pay increases, capital equipment spending reprofiling, and other less apparent restrictions which collectively total about $3 billion per year in a budget of approximately $21 billion. Overall, this is a far cry from the two percent real growth proposed at the time of the CFDS creation. The world environment and the potential demands that might be placed on the Canadian Armed Forces have also changed. The withdrawal of all major elements of military forces from Afghani- stan, after 12 years of wide-ranging involvement, will be complete early this year. While a number of other, smaller international de- ployments will continue, none involves the commitment of per- sonnel and resources that the missions to Afghanistan have de- manded. With that intense undertaking essentially behind us, the obvious question is whether a Canadian government would ever again seriously consider another similar combat mission, given the financial cost and the risk to human life, short of a declared war. And yet, the CFDS guidance remains unchanged, leaving DND to assess the potential threats which could precipitate a deploy- ment and the implications for existing and contemplated military capabilities. As these fundamental changes in circumstance are evaluated it needs to be acknowledged that the full scope of equipment acqui- sition identified in the CFDS is not affordable. Delays in procure- ment, with loss of purchasing power due to inflation, have been a factor, but there has always been concern that the capabilities desired were more than what the projected defence budget could accommodate. The reality is that the defence budget is smaller now and, until it is returned to initially anticipated levels and more, the CFDS can only be realistically reviewed in the context of the resources available. To deal with this reality, some "rectification actions" are already being implemented by default through delayed acquisitions, re- duction in the anticipated scope of capabilities, extension of the

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