Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/337874
S SECURITY 40 JUNE/JULY 2014 www.vanguardcanada.com meantime, terrorism in Canada and abroad remains a persistent if low-level threat as we hone our counterterrorism strategy to better defend our interests. Along the way we will score some vic- tories, like we have by dismantling al Qa- eda's core leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But at other times al Qaeda will regain the momentum, as it did in 2012 by nearly overrunning Mali, and as it is doing again today in parts of Syria and Iraq. These developments cannot be dis- missed. A 2013 CSIS report noted that "the oxygen" al Qaeda has depended upon throughout its history has "been its pos- session of, or access to, physical sanctuary and safe haven." Al Qaeda's new toehold in Syria, for instance, is attracting scores of foreign jihadists, including thousands from the Middle East, Western Europe, Russia, and the United States. Canadians have not been immune to this siren's call: at least a hundred have travelled to Syria to join rebel groups, and many are suspected of having joined al Qaeda's local franchise and other jihadi organizations. Most notably, Ali Dirie – a self-confessed, convicted, and later released member of the Toronto 18 – recently evaded Cana- dian authorities despite not having his own passport, travelled to Syria, and died fight- ing alongside hardcore militant Islamists. If a settlement is improbable and out- right victory over al Qaeda unlikely, the best we can do is manage the threat over the long run. Herein, what does good counterterrorism look like? In my view, counterterrorism has two overarching re- quirements. First, we need to counter the capability of militant groups; and second, we need to counter the motivation of groups and individuals to facilitate acts of terrorism and political violence. What fol- lows is a summary of these processes along with a discussion of why even good coun- terterrorism sometimes falls short. Counter-capability approaches are tactical in nature. The idea is to eliminate the sources of power that allow terrorist groups to organize acts of violence. We are talking about the sharp end of the stick, here, the sorts of things we do in order to destroy militant training facilities, or eliminate militant leaders, or deter state sponsorship of terrorism. But other forms of counter-capability involve strengthen- ing domestic and international institu- tions that help states better control their territory, or constricting the international financing of militancy, and uncovering, dis- rupting, and thwarting plots. Each process limits a group's capacity to commit acts of violence. Alone, however, counter-capability is probably not enough. Terrorism is not just violence, but violence with a political pur- pose. If we expect to develop strategies that have a lasting effect, we need to challenge the logic and legitimacy of al Qaeda's ideol- ogy and goals. Counter-motivation pro- cesses help fill the void: they are ideational in nature. The objective is to impede al Qa- eda from achieving its larger social, politi- cal, and strategic goals, to foster global anti- terrorism and anti-al Qaeda norms, and to champion and reward non-violent alterna- tives. We are not talking about root causes, per se, but rather about hearts and minds. Terrorists lose when the violence they or- chestrate no longer resonates with a (pur- portedly) supportive community. Counter- motivation involves tackling the concepts and rationales that sustain al Qaeda's larger movement. The focus here is on de- legitimizing its ideology and on denying terrorism's efficacy for addressing real or perceived political grievances. Importantly, counter-capability and counter-motivation are intertwined. By diminishing a group's capability, for instance, we dissuade partici- pants; and by dissuading participants, we diminish militant capability. Both processes are built into Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy. The strategy's four pillars – prevent, detect, deny, and re- spond – are based on the logic of counter- capability and counter-motivation. The buzz word that weaves the four pillars to- gether is resilience: resilience at the com- munity level to repel and reject violent ide- ologies, and resilience at the national level to defeat terrorists at home and to bounce back, as a free and democratic society, if at- tacks do take place. Each pillar is mutually reinforcing. The message is that terrorists will meet stiff resistance: Canadian security agencies have the mandate and the means to iden- tify and deal effectively with threats. Plots will be thwarted, perpetrators jailed. The strategy's general point is to communicate to would-be militants that they will fail to attract support among other Canadians, that their plans will be foiled, and that Ca- nadians will stand together and resolutely against radicalism and political violence. In an ideal world, a terrorist contemplating an attack in Canada will realize just how unlikely they are to succeed. And theoreti- cally, a militant who believes they are likely to fail may be less willing to try. In the real world, however, things get messy. Even smart counterterrorism faces unintended tradeoffs and runs into the occasional paradox. Expectations then go out the window. Two specific tradeoffs are worth exploring in detail. First, some counter-capability opera- tions are double-edged swords: the benefit we gain is neutralized by an unanticipated cost. Take the U.S. targeted killings pro- gram. Targeted killings are the intentional slaying of foreign-based militant leaders