Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
Issue link: http://vanguardcanada.uberflip.com/i/407740
the country's fighter jet requirements materialize. They are, how- ever, critically important and remind us that Canada can fulfill its domestic, regional, and global security commitments without resorting to expensive combat aircraft. As can be evidenced by recent operations in Afghanistan (2001-2014), Iraq (2014), Sri Lanka (2005), and Haiti (2010) most of Canada's overseas mili- tary deployments have consisted of providing relief, confronting Islamic insurgents, and/or engaging in stabilization efforts in the absence of significant support from fighter jets. To be fair, this simply reflects the changing nature of 21st cen- tury military operations. Even so, a case could be made that there remains a conventional (that is, continental or territorial defence) dimension to modern conflict that would be difficult to resolve without sufficient airpower. Yet, within the context of securing Canadian sovereignty, we are not convinced this is necessarily true anymore. We say this because it remains unclear who represents a genuine conventional threat to Canadian national security – and one that could not be reasonably dispatched by employing sophis- ticated drones, mobile ballistic missile stations, and distant early warning systems. Russia's aggressive posturing in the Ukraine is, to some extent, a worrying sign. But Canada has never been a "Soviet buffer state" and we do not have a high concentration of ethnic Rus- sian separatists in the Yukon appealing to Moscow for support. In truth, it is hard to accept that Canada will be the victim of a Red Dawn-like attack in the future. Why? For one, North America has an exceptional early warn- ing detection system (NORAD) in place. This, along with the United States' 354th Fighter Wing Squadron at Eielson Air Force Base (Alaska), and an active anti-aircraft ballistic missile capability, makes for a satisfactory redoubt against a Russian incursion of any significant size. Canada also has the advantage of a vast and open hinterland and thus time. Ultimately, Russia (and/or China) does not have the political will, military hardware, logistical capability, and/or desire to attack and establish dominance over Canadian airspace. Certainly, minor airspace violations will occur – after all, Canada is a big country with limited resources – but a more pow- erful "early warning" and missile defence network may be enough to address current and future challenges and ensure that Canadian Arctic claims (in particular) remain well-respected. If, as we contend, modern threats are of a fundamentally dif- ferent nature and the risks posed by Russia and/or China are low – though still a possibility – then what kind of equipment would better serve Canada's immediate and longer-term strategic and operational needs? As we have already intimated, drones and missiles seem to be the answer to Ottawa's rather whimsical approach to defence spending. UAVs, for example, have now evolved into universal and indispensible components of state power and their military, law enforcement, and developing commercial applications have been impressive. The Royal Air Force has identified combat drones as the United Kingdom's go-to weapons system of the future – largely because of their ability to provide field command- ers with vital "armed intelligence and situational awareness" and complete the "find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess kill chain" in one fatal and effective stroke. Their growing importance can be further illustrated by highlighting the U.S. Air Forces' recent ef- forts to train more drone pilots than actual aircraft pilots. The bottom line for modern defence forces is that UAVs are efficient, lethal, surreptitious, mobile, and can be deployed in multiple environments. Additionally, drones can remain airborne U UNmANNED SYSTEMS www.vanguardcanada.com OCTOBER/nOVEMBER 2014 19