Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
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equipped and trained – a proven way to fi ght us on more even ground. Moreover, potential conventional adver- saries, notably Iran and North Korea, have noted the clear disruptive success of IEDs, which immobilized unprepared forces in Afghanistan, and are mass producing IED components to "conventionalize" their use. Clearly, those who argue we need to go back to the basics – at the exclusion of C-IED training – fail fully to appreciate what has happened over the past decade. Consequently, CET ought to be a funda- mental, core capability – not a "tactical fi x- ation" exemplifi ed by slogans such as "the war on IEDs" – to protect the force and ensure freedom of manoeuvre and action so tactical missions can be accomplished in support of operational objectives and stra- tegic goals. Much as ships would not leave port untrained and unequipped for mines, modern land forces should not again de- ploy unprepared for improvised explosives. Threat networks An array of complex, associated, trans- national networks, facilitated by today's "fl at world," and driven by non-state ac- tors with common goals, is behind much of the chaos. And while threats ebb and fl ow based on geopolitical factors, these networks of extreme non-state actors re- main connected, and are adaptive and re- silient. These networks, often criminal or ideological in nature, fl ourish under "[w] eak government and the absence of rule of law, corruption…poverty, illiteracy, high unemployment, [and] large populations of disaffected youth..." Increasingly sophisti- cated, these threat networks, "sans fron- tiers," present omnipresent dangers. Explosive devices are used by over 40 re- gional, transnational and inter-connected networks. Moreover, different types of networks – terrorist, transnational criminal organizations (narcotic, human traffi cking, weapon proliferation), and IED – are of- ten themselves connected. Recent devel- opments see a weaker terrorist core but ideological messages that resonate with some, leading to the promulgation of self and peer-peer radicalized and dispersed af- fi liates, which are more diffi cult to disrupt because they act in accordance with their understanding of the networks' core intent rather than detailed direction to act that can be intercepted by intelligence agencies. Consider for a moment the potential se- riousness of the problem. It is clear based on their behavior that, if they had nuclear weapons, some of these organizations would likely use them. It is therefore vi- tal that intelligence assets illuminate these evolving networks and maintain a "persis- tent stare" into them, using all elements of national power to at least defend against their destructive activities, if not attack and disrupt them before they can strike. "It takes a network to defeat a network," therefore efforts must be integrated across like-minded nations, governmental depart- ments, and agencies in a "counter threat," rather than a strictly CET partnership of action. Ultimately, networks are jurisdic- tionally blind and the solution requires an integrated, multinational, cross-govern- ment approach, and a clearly espoused and accepted recognition of the danger. Given Canada's demographics, it is clear that sinews of these networks reach into our metropolitan cities and are embraced by "home grown" threats. This poses an ever-present domestic risk, if not an immi- nent threat. The terrorist threat is recog- nized in Building Resilience against Terror- ism: Canada's Counter Terrorism Strategy as a key feature in the "national security landscape for the foreseeable future." Where there are terrorists, there are bombs. Although the Department of Pub- lic Safety has the domestic counter impro- vised explosives lead and DND and other agencies principally play a supporting role, the CAF needs to be postured to assist as required. The CAF is expected to play a vi- tal role "in the preparation for, and execu- tion of, any deployment of CF in response to terrorist activity at home and abroad." It seems, however, not enough is being done to realize this integrated approach, and in fact the Snowden revelations seem to be closing doors once open and hardening ex- isting stovepipes, undermining further the interagency cooperation required today. Illuminating, countering, attacking, disrupting There is a shared global challenge here that requires a coordinated response. After a decade of dealing with an adaptable en- emy and a technically evolving threat that leverages commercial research and devel- opment by buying what they need off the self, it is becoming increasingly expensive to equip forces to protect them against the explosive threat; in fact, there are ware- houses of military equipment superseded by technology developed by commercial companies. It therefore makes sense to dis- rupt belligerents "left of the bang," before bombs are placed. Central to maintaining and evolving the CET capability, as well as countering threat networks, is intelligence support. Ideally an interagency organization would exist to sup- port military operations, such the American Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) CIED Opera- tions and Intelligence Centre (COIC). The COIC is focused on the explosive threat in support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but is beginning to take a more global view of networks that might threaten U.S. forces and Americans, at home and abroad. One could imagine given the intertwined and cross jurisdictional nature of networks coupled with the blending of lines that dif- ferentiate between conventional and asym- metric confl ict and borders, that a mul- tiagency fusion centre might be created within the CAF focused not just on IEDs but other asymmetric threats – a "coun- ter threat network" construct – to better prepare for future challenges. If this is not possible, a virtual interagency and depart- mental, integrated CET intelligence sup- port framework, to inform a counter threat network partnership of action, is required to monitor threat networks. Intelligence is fundamental to everything the JCET TF does, whether identifying evolving spirals of technological advance- ments that belligerents purchase off the self, or optimizing electronic counter measures, properly equipping our forces, providing reach-back support to deployed forces, ex- ploiting devices and incident scenes, sup- porting operational planning, and ensuring we understand belligerent tactics and prop- erly prepare during "road to high readiness training." All source intelligence is also ab- solutely vital to disrupt, attack, and counter by other means, threat networks. It is useful to fi rst look at the problem of networks from a military perspective so as not to be viewed as meddling in domestic matters clearly in the remit of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. NATO and C COveR 32 octoBer/noVeMBer 2014 www.vanguardcanada.com