Preserving capacity, General Tom Lawson, Chief of the Defence Staff, Keys to Canadian SAR
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C COveR 34 octoBer/noVeMBer 2014 www.vanguardcanada.com key allies, doctrinally, tackle the problem as follows. Military forces attack the network in the theatre of operations to disrupt the branches of networks that operate there. These networks, however, often extend outside of the theatre into countries not specifi cally involved in the confl ict, where they support belligerents operating in the- atre, whether it is by recruiting, fi nancing, equipping or training. These parts of net- works must also be disrupted, which re- quires a country and its allies to leverage all elements of national power to have an ef- fect. This activity – counter threat network – is a multiagency activity conducted in sup- port of military operations. During the con- fl ict in Afghanistan, the CAF and allies had some success in their "attack the network" efforts in theatre, but Canada undertook little if any counter threat network activi- ties outside threat; activities in Pakistan and elsewhere that supported insurgents operat- ing in Afghanistan were not disrupted and there was little cohesive effort to do so. Canada should therefore endeavor to breakdown the "silos of excellence" and establish a more inclusive integrated, inter- agency and departmental intelligence sup- port framework, perhaps building on the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre or creating a virtually connected organization to support future military operations. The ingenuity of this approach is that the same group can also counter threat networks with a domestic nexus, with the military taking a back seat to Public Safety. This approach would align much better to the cross-jurisdictional nature of networks and the blurred lines between conventional and asymmetric confl ict. One key aspect that hinders better col- laboration is a lack of policy, strategies, and modalities that would direct or drive better cooperation. Today Canada and the CAF have no CET or asymmetric threat policy or strategy, something that might be re- quired given the complexity of the prob- lem set and myriad agencies involved to maintain capability and prevent attacks at home and abroad. The new JCeT Tf An enduring threat requires an enduring capability, one that is integrated, interde- partmental, and international in scope. Although most of our close allies are only now starting to face the challenge of wan- ing military and political interest post- Afghanistan, all have recognized the en- during nature of the specifi c improvised explosive threat and the requirement to maintain a capability to deal with it. As a positive fi rst step in Canada, in Sep- tember 2013 the CAF formally recognized the persistent nature of this threat and per- manently established the JCET TF. It is clear there is much synergy to be gained by maintaining a central organization fo- cused on the problem set to coordinate the effort within DND. The task force is central to maintaining a relevant Canadian capability. The JCET TF's mission is to en- able collaboration within DND and with cross-government, multinational and other partners at home and abroad in support of CAF and government missions to: prepare both civilian and military personnel; pre- vent malign actors from using IEDs; and protect CAF and government personnel and Canadian interests. The capability must be sustained along three pillars: PREVENT, PROTECT, and PREPARE. Prevention "left of the boom" is best achieved by disrupting counter-IED networks that employ them at the tactical level, and various threat networks that sup- port and facilitate them at the operational and strategic levels. This requires an inte- grated, international, cross-government, multi-agency effort and intelligence/opera- tions fusion at all levels to establish a "con- tinuous stare" into the networks so they may be monitored and disrupted; much work remains to improve this capability. Forces are protected by detecting and neutralizing improvised explosive threats before they strike, and mitigating both physical and psychological consequences of an explosion. Science and technology and dedicated research and development are required to stay ahead of the threat spi- ral as adversaries continue to leverage read- ily available disruptive technologies. Thor- ough preparation of personnel so they effectively operate in high explosive threat environments is achieved by ensuring they are threat aware, and well trained and equipped, to defeat technologically evolv- ing devices and an adaptable adversary. While IEDs are today the weapon of choice for many adversaries, it may not al- ways be the case as detection methods im- prove or other even more effi cient disrup- tive technologies are developed and used by adversaries "to cause havoc." There is, therefore, an argument that the JCET TF could transition to or be subsumed in a strategic, joint asymmetric threat organi- zation that might focus on non-conven- tional threats. Under this umbrella might fall counter NBCD, explosive, cyber, net- work/terrorist, and future threat compo- nents – food for thought. Nonetheless, countering IEDs is a force protection matter, not a direct means to achieving mission success and viewing the problem as a "war against the IED'" – be- coming "device centric" can create tacti- cal myopia. Ultimately, the JCET TF helps ensure future strategic military response options are unconstrained by the explosive threat, and our forces are protected and that freedom of action and movement are preserved so tactical missions can be ac- complished in support of operational ob- jectives and strategic goals. The best defence against the explosive threat remains the well trained soldier and must be a fundamental skill taught to all soldiers at all levels of their training. Con- tinued work is required to institutionalize both general and specialist CET training in the CAF. Change happens in the school house and it is there that a new mindset that recognizes the enduring and omni- present nature of the threat can be created. Ultimately, the best C-IED equipment in the hands of poorly trained and unaware soldiers is useless. Counter explosive threat training is today a basic core skill. Conclusion We should not forget about the explosive threat even though Canadian soldiers no longer face it. As the champion of the CET capability, the JCET TF has a role to keep this threat in front of the CAF leadership. Canada went to Afghanistan completely unprepared for the improvised explosive threat; from our mindset to training, equip- ment to vehicles, intelligence to tactical level procedures, we were not ready. The effort to institutionalize hard learned knowledge, experience and capabilities gathered over a decade of confl ict must continue until counter-IED is not only an entrenched specialist capability, but a core skill across the Army and the CAF.